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INDEPENDENCE OF AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION





A MONG THE MOST important means of improving safety is
to objectively determine the causes of aviation accidents so
that appropriate action can be taken to prevent similar events
from recurring in the future. The determination of causation
can have an adverse political, economic, punitive, and reputa-
tional effect upon individuals, airlines, manufacturers, air navi-
gation service providers, airports, maintenance companies, and
governmental institutions. Hence, many institutions and indi-
viduals are motivated to try to influence the outcome of the
investigation.
Article 26 of the Chicago Convention requires a State in
which an aviation accident occurs (involving death or serious
injury, or involving a serious technical defect in the aircraft or
air navigation facilities) to investigate the event. The Chicago
Convention obliges the 190 ratifying States to implement the
* This study parallels a similar evaluation by the McGill University Centre for
Research on Air & Space Law and the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) on governance structures of Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), of
which this author was the principal investigator: McGill University/ICAO, Air
Navigation: Fying Through Congested Skies (Paul Dempsey, ed., McGill/ICAO
2007). That study focused on governance structures of ANSPs in ten States. See
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/CongestedSkies.pdf.
** Tomlinson Professor of Global Governance in Air & Space Law, and
Director of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University, Montreal,
Canada. From 1979 to 2002, Dr. Dempsey was Professor of Law & Director of the
Transportation Law Program, University of Denver College of Law, Denver,
Colorado. A.B.J. (1972), J.D. (1975), University of Georgia; LL.M. (1978),
George Washington University; D.C.L. (1986), McGill University. Admitted to
the practice of law in Colorado, Georgia, and the District of Columbia.
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standards promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) in Annexes to the Convention through their
legislation, regulations, policies, and organizational structures.
Annex 13 addresses aviation accident investigations.
Annex 13 provides that "the accident investigation authority
shall have independence in the conduct of the investigation and
have unrestricted authority over its conduct. . . ." It also recom-
mends that any court or administrative action designed to ap-
portion blame or impose liability be autonomous from the
accident or incident investigation. Annex 13 designates the
State where the accident occurred as the appropriate body for
designating the Investigator in Charge (1IC). ICAO advises that,
"The accident investigation authority must be strictly objective
and totally impartial and must be perceived to be so. It should
be established in such a way that it can withstand political or
other interference or pressure."
II.
Because of the compelling need to protect public safety, and
to ensure unbiased accuracy and credibility in the investigatory
process and its findings, many States have fulfilled their interna-
tional obligations under the Chicago Convention by establishing
specialized, autonomous, and independent agencies to investi-
gate transportation safety incidents and accidents, determine
causation, and make recommendations for prevention of future
such occurrences. Some States have been motivated to make
the investigatory body formally independent from other trans-
port governmental institutions.
This study examines the legal and policy issues surrounding
the independence and autonomy of aviation accident investiga-
tory bodies. It provides case studies of the structural and organi-
zational models in Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, New
Zealand, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union (E.U.). It examines the laws and policies
of several States on:
The technical role: the independence of investigation authori-
ties responsible for airworthiness, certification, flight operation,
maintenance, licensing, air traffic management, or airport oper-
ation; and
The social role the independence of investigation authorities
from any party whose interests or mandates could conflict with
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the independence of the investigation or influence its
objectivity.
Strong political and economic forces can be mobilized to try
to influence the investigation and bias the outcome of the
cause(s) of an aviation accident. These challenges require an
investigation that is performed by an investigatory body that: (1)
is independent, unbiased, honest, and free of political or indus-
try influence; (2) has unhampered access to the evidence; (3)
has adequate financial, human and operational resources; and
(4) possesses a high degree of professional competence, integ-
rity, and expertise. Many States have made investigation institu-
tions organizationally, operationally, and functionally
independent and autonomous from other governmental institu-
tions, and in particular, from the transport regulator and the
judiciary. The E.U. too, has mandated that the accident/inci-
dent investigation agency must be functionally independent of
the national aviation authorities responsible for airworthiness,
certification, flight operation, maintenance, licensing, air traffic
control or airport operation, and independent of any other
party whose interests might conflict with the responsibilities en-
trusted to the investigating entity. Lately, however, the E.U. has
flirted with giving the European Air Safety Agency (EASA) a role
in the appointment of investigators, which might constitute a
conflict of interest.
Functionally, the safety investigator is often separated from
the safety regulator-the investigator investigates the causes of
safety accidents and incidents and makes recommendations to
the regulator for corrective action, while the regulator promul-
gates and enforces regulations on the aviation industry. Both
investigators and regulators have safety as their ultimate goal,
but their organizational and functional lines are kept firm to
enhance the objectivity of the investigating agency, and there-
fore the credibility of its findings. Often, these organizational
and functional lines have been drawn after a tainted accident
investigation caused an erosion of public confidence in the in-
vestigator's objectivity. Sometimes, it is the aviation regulator
itself that is the subject of inquiry; allowing the regulator to in-
fluence the investigation creates a manifest conflict of interest.
In many States, the functional and operational lines of the
regulator are also kept separate from the judiciary and its civil
and criminal litigation. The investigating body focuses on
causes of accidents, as a catalyst for corrective and preventive
action, but not blame or the imposition of sanctions. In con-
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trast, civil or criminal litigation focuses on causation as a catalyst
for blame (fault), liability, compensation, and sometimes crimi-
nal punishment. Keeping these functions separate helps ensure
that the investigatory body is free from conflicts of interest
which may jeopardize its objectivity as a safety watchdog, and
thereby corrode its credibility. An accident investigation body is
like a medical doctor attempting to diagnose the cause of an
illness. Sometimes the doctor must prescribe a remedy that is
expensive, inconvenient, and painful. Only if the doctor is per-
ceived to be both competent and objective will the patient un-
dergo an unpleasant and expensive, yet necessary, cure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft accidents are often dramatic catastrophic events,
sometimes involving the death or injury of hundreds of passen-
gers and crew and the destruction of tens, and sometimes hun-
dreds, of millions of dollars of property. Because so many lives
may be lost in a single event, airline accidents generate wide-
spread media and public attention, often making headlines on
the front pages of newspapers, web sites, and broadcast media,
and sometimes spurring hundreds of lawsuits. The crash of a
large commercial aircraft also can impose major financial bur-
dens upon insurers, air carriers, and manufacturers.'
Enhancing the safety of transport facilitates the manifest pub-
lic interest in protecting human life and property. Among the
most important means of improving safety is objectively to deter-
mine the causes of aviation accidents, so that appropriate action
can be taken to prevent similar events from recurring in the fu-
ture.2 The "cause" of an aviation catastrophe consists of the
"omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof which
led to the accident or incident."' Since modern commercial air-
craft, airlines, and air navigation systems are technologically and
I Liability costs of a single catastrophic commercial aircraft accident can reach
into the several hundreds of millions of dollars, Euros, or British Pounds Sterling.
2 Final Report of the Group of Experts to Advise the Commission on a Strategy
to Deal with Accidents in the Transport Sector (2006), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/transport/roadsafety-library/publications/rosatjfinal report of
the-group.pdf.
3 Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation, ch. 1 (9th ed. 2001), [hereinafter Annex 13] available at
http://www.cad.gov.rs/docs/udesi/anl3_cons.pdf (defining "causes"). Annex
13 addresses two broad categories of events-"accidents" and "incidents"-and
one sub-category, "serious incidents." Francis Shubert, Legal Barriers to a Safety
Culture in Aviation, 29 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 19, 25 (2004). States are en-
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operationally complex, determining the cause of an accident
can be equally complex.' The determination of causation can
have an adverse political, economic, punitive, and reputational
effect upon individuals, airlines, manufacturers, air navigation
service providers, airports, maintenance companies, and govern-
mental institutions. Hence, many institutions and individuals
are motivated to try to influence the outcome of the
investigation.
Investigating an accident to determine its cause can be impor-
tant for several reasons:
* To determine civil liability and award compensation for the
victims;
* To impose regulatory sanctions and criminal penalties on
wrongdoers; and
* To improve the safety of air transport.
This article focuses on the latter of these three purposes.
Because of the compelling need to protect public safety, most
States have fulfilled their international obligations under the
Chicago Convention5 by establishing specialized agencies to in-
vestigate transportation safety incidents6 and accidents,7 deter-
mine causation, and make recommendations for prevention of
future such occurrences.' To ensure the unbiased accuracy and
couraged to extend the scope of safety investigations to accidents and serious
incidents. Id. at 29.
4Jack London, Issues of Trustworthiness and Reliability of Evidence from NTSB In-
vestigations in Third Party Liability Proceedings, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 39, 56 (2003).
[A]s the aviation industry produces more sophisticated equipment,
which often depends on computer-controlled solutions to rapidly
changing flight conditions, it is unlikely that NTSB investigators
can keep up with the thousands of versions of software, displays,
and applications by which modern aircraft are flown and con-
trolled. Increasing demands on air traffic control systems, the
proliferation of airways and of off-airway navigation with global
positioning devices, and ageing fleets compound the problems.
However, the task of investigators is not to "keep up" with techno-
logical changes, but to determine causes of accidents and incidents.
Id.
5 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
V.N.T.X. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
6 An "incident" is "[a]n occurrence, other than an accident" that potentially
"could affect the safety or operation." Annex 13, supra note 3, ch. 1.
7 An "accident" is an occurrence associated with aircraft operation in which a
person suffers death or serious injury or in which the aircraft suffers substantial
damage. Id.
8 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], ICAO Accident Prevention Program (2005),
available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/anb/aig/app-2005090 7 .pdf.
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credibility of their findings, most investigation agencies in devel-
oped countries have been made autonomous from, and inde-
pendent of, other governmental institutions.' As explained
below, independence and autonomy of the safety investigation
organization are essential to ensure accuracy and credibility of
safety investigations.
Aviation accident investigations identify and elucidate the
causes of a safety incident or accident, and thereby can reduce
the probability of a recurrence. Investigations can also:
* Enable a better understanding of "the events leading up to
the occurrence;
* Identify hazards and conduct risk assessments;"
* Provide the basis for "recommendations to reduce or elimi-
nate unacceptable risks;" and
* Enable the communication of "the safety messages to the ap-
propriate stakeholders." 0
The goal of the investigator is principally proactive-to pre-
vent future aviation accidents-yet the investigation is per-
formed principally in a reactive manner, responding to a
catastrophic event." The core purpose of feedback is to learn
the lessons of the past-to learn from prior mistakes, and pre-
vent the repetition of such events in the future.12 The experi-
ence-based feedback loop is an important feature of safety
management and a basic tenet of danger science and risk
prevention.1 3
This article examines issues of governance, structure, inde-
pendence, autonomy, and technical ability surrounding govern-
mental agencies that investigate aviation accidents. It assesses
the importance of these issues to the credibility of the institu-
tions that perform these crucial functions; the interactions be-
tween the investigator, the regulator, and the operator; and the
social expectations of the public for an objective and honest as-
sessment of the causes of aviation catastrophes.
9 Shubert, supra note 3, at 33 ("Effective formal autonomy is common through-
out the world.").
1o Safety Occurrence Investigation, http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/
SafetyOccurrenceInvestigation (last visited May 19, 2009).
11 LiAM P. SARSFIELD ET AL., SAFETY IN THE SKIES: PERSONNEL AND PARTIES IN
NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS MASTER VOLUME 5 (2005), http://
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/2005/MR1122.1.pdf.
12 Shubert, supra note 3, at 21-22.
13 Claude Abraham, Is France Moving Towards Establishing a Similar Board to the
NTSB in America? 33 JAPAN RAILWAY & TRANSPORT REv. 28, 28 (2002).
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II. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
Article 26 of the Chicago Convention of 194414 requires a
State, in which an accident occurs "involving death or serious
injury, or indicating serious technical defect in the aircraft or air
navigation facilities," to investigate the event, though the State
of aircraft registry may appoint observers to the investigation."
The Chicago Convention attempted to establish a uniform re-
gime of safety and navigation in international aviation and to
that end created the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO).' 6 Among ICAO's principal objectives is to meet the
needs of the public for "safe, regular, efficient and economical
air transport."" ICAO promulgates "International Standards
and Recommended Practices" (SARPs), standardizing safety and
navigation in air transportation. Areas addressed by ICAO in-
clude personnel licensing, rules of the air, aeronautical meteor-
ology, charts, units of measurement, operation of aircraft,
airworthiness, aeronautical telecommunications, air traffic ser-
vices, search and rescue, aircraft noise and emissions, security,
navigation, and accident investigation.
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention requires every con-
tracting State to keep its regulations uniform, to the greatest ex-
tent possible, with those established under the Convention."
Article 37 attempts to achieve uniformity in air navigation by
14 Chicago Convention, supra note 5, art. 26.
15 See Dan Fiorita, The International Framework of Aircraft Accident Investigation-
Contemporary Issues, 19 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 161, 166 (1994). Specifically, Arti-
cle 26 provides:
In the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State oc-
curring in the territory of another contracting State, and involving
death or serious injury, or indicating serious technical defect in the
aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident
occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the acci-
dent, in accordance, so far as its laws permit, with the procedure
which maybe recommended by the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization. The State in which the aircraft is registered shall be
given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the in-
quiry and the State holding the inquiry shall communicate the re-
port and findings in the matter to that State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 5, art. 26.
16 Id. art. 43.
17 Id. art. 44.
18 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAw AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AviA-
TION 273-95 (1987).
19 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAW MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIIL AVIA-
TION ORGANIZATION 102 (1969) ("The elimination of the multitude of conflicting
national aeronautical regulations, through the domestic implementation of the
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requiring that every contracting State cooperate in achieving
the "highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations,
standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft,
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which
such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. "20
The sentence that follows provides that "to this end [ICAO]
shall adopt and amend from time to time ... international stan-
dards and recommended practices and procedures" addressing
various aspects of air navigation. 2 1 Therefore, ICAO's 190 Mem-
ber States have an affirmative obligation to conform their do-
mestic laws, rules, and regulations to the international leveling
standards adopted by ICAO.
SARPs become effective as Annexes to the Convention not
less than three months after they are approved by a two-thirds
vote of the ICAO Council, unless during that period they are
disapproved by a majority of the members of the ICAO General
Assembly.22 Typically, they are not issued until after extensive
consultation with Member States and consensus is achieved, a
process that takes two years or more. Member States are obliged
by Article 37 of the Chicago Convention to collaborate in
achieving the "highest practicable degree of uniformity" in the
adoption of SARPs."
III. ANNEX 13
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
Of the eighteen Annexes to the Chicago Convention, Annex
13 (Accident Investigation),2 4 originally promulgated in 1951, is
regulatory SARPs prescribed in the Annexes, would be an immense step forward
in facilitating international civil aviation.").
20 Chicago Convention, supra note 5, art. 37.
21 Id.
22 Id. art. 90(a).
23 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance & Enforcement in International Law: Achiev-
ing Global Uniformity in Aviation Safety, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 15
(2004). "In 1948, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution encouraging con-
tracting States to adopt 'so far as practicable, the precise language of those ICAO
Standards that are of a regulatory character . . . .'" Id. at 12 (quoting Chicago
Convention, supra note 5, Annex 1). "ICAO has drafted its Annexes in a way to
'facilitate incorporation, without major textual changes, into national legisla-
tion.'" Id. "Subject to the notification of differences, the legal regime effectively
assumes that States are in compliance with these safety mandates." Id.
24 Annex 13, supra note 3. See generally Samantha Sharif, The Failure of Aviation
Safety in New Zealand: An Examination of New Zealand's Implementation of Its Interna-
tional Obligations Under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Avi-
ation, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 339 (2003); Evan P. Singer, Recent Developments in
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among the most succinct.2 5 A half century later, in 2001, the
ninth edition of Annex 13 was adopted. It consists of eight
chapters, an appendix, and four attachments. Annex 13 was
amended in 2006 to add a fifth attachment (Attachment E) ad-
dressing legal guidance for the protection of information from
safety data collection and processing systems. At this writing, an
amended version of Annex 13 edition is expected to be released
in 2010.
One source observed:
While Annex 13 provides a common framework for accident in-
vestigations around the world, there are many differences in
structure and governance arrangements adopted to give effect to
its standards and recommendations. States generally adopt the
key guidance of ICAO with regard to the independence of the
accident investigator, but with many variations ....
B. PURPOSES OF THE INVESTIGATION
An accident investigation can serve several different purposes:
* To provide corrective action;
* To punish a wrongdoer; or
* To compensate injured parties.
But under Annex 13, the sole objective is prevention of future
accidents, not the apportionment of blame or liability for prior
accidents or incidents.27 Specifically, Annex 13 provides, inter
alia: "The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or inci-
dent shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not
the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability. "28
This separation of investigatory from liability and criminal func-
tions is repeated in several places in the Annex: "Any judicial or
administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability
should be separate from any investigation conducted under the
Aviation Safety: Proposals to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate and the Debate Over Data
Protection, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 499, 506 (2002); Col. Luis E. Ortiz & Dr. Griselda
Capaldo, Can justice Use Technical and Personal Information Obtained Through Aircraft
Accident Investigations?, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 263, 272-77 (2000) (recommending
certain amendments to Annex 13).
25 For a summary of Annex 13, see PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL AIR LAW 158-60 (2008).
26 ATSB/CASA REVIEw 2007 (2007), http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/
aviation/safety/pdf/ATSBCASAReview_2007.pdf.
27 Ortiz & Capaldo, supra note 24, at 265; DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 158.
28 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 3.1 (emphasis added).
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provisions of this Annex." 29 Hence, a strict separation is con-
templated between technical investigations and judicial inquir-
ies, the former focusing on causation and prevention, and the
latter focusing on blame. 0 Recognizing the parallel paths pur-
sued by investigators and litigants, though separation of func-
tions is emphasized, coordination between the investigation and
judicial authorities is contemplated as well. 1 Such coordination
must ensure that both safety investigation and judicial authori-
ties can share factual information.
An investigation into the causes of an aircraft accident or seri-
ous incidentS2 is essential in order to prevent repeated occur-
rences.3 3  The adoption of remedial measures from lessons
learned from accidents and incidents avoids repetition of safety
problems. U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Vice Chairman Robert Sumwalt observed:
[A]s air safety investigators, we're not there to point fingers, to
lay blame, to assign fault, to push a personal agenda, or to help
lawyers build their cases. As safety investigators, our job is to de-
termine what happened so we can prevent it from happening
again ....
We are here to serve the traveling public by conducting proper
investigations that enhance safety. We are not here to please the
manufacturers; we are not here to please the regulatory
authorities.
We are here to conduct honest, competent, thorough and timely
investigations that identify systemic or individual weaknesses and
then issue recommendations aimed at correcting those
deficiencies."
29 Id. 5.4.1.
30 John A. Stoop & James P. Kahan, Flying Is the Safest Way to Travel: How Avia-
tion Was a Pioneer in Independent Accident Investigation, 5 EUR. J. TRANsP. & INFRA-
sTRucTuRE REs. 115, 117 (2005).
31 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.10 ("The State conducting the investigation
shall recognize the need for coordination between the investigator-in-charge and
the judicial authorities."). See also Ortiz & Capaldo, supra note 24, at 273.
32 A "serious incident" is an "incident involving circumstances indicating an
accident nearly occurred." Rudolf Kapustin, How to Prevent Major Accidents Effec-
tively, 10 AIR & SPACE LAw. 1, 17 (1996) (quoting Annex 13, supra note 3, ch. 1).
Although the Chicago Convention refers to "accidents," Annex 13 refers to
"accidents and incidents" as well as "serious incidents." MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 91 (2008).
- Robert Sumwalt, Vice Chairman Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd. (NTSB), Remarks
to the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (May 1, 2008), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/sumwalt/rls080501.html.
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Sumwalt here emphasizes the social role of the investiga-
tion-to assure the public that the aviation investigatory system
has been designed to dissect the cause of accidents, and to learn
from them so that they are not repeated.
Similar to Annex 13, the U.K. regulations governing aviation
accident investigation provide: "The sole objective of the investi-
gation of an accident or incident under these Regulations shall
be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It shall not be the
purpose of such an investigation to apportion blame or liabil-
ity."" The relevant Australian statute provides:
[T]he following are not objects of this Act:
(a) apportioning blame for transport accidents or incidents;
(b) providing the means to determine the liability of any person
in respect of a transport accident or incident;
(c) assisting in court proceedings between parties (except as ex-
pressly provided by this Act);
(d) allowing any adverse inference to be drawn from the fact
that a person is subject to an investigation under this Act."
Hence, the purpose of the investigation is to determine the
cause or causes (the actions, inactions, processes, events, condi-
tions or systemic failures) that led to the accident or incident by
assessing the evidence and drawing conclusions in order, where
appropriate, to make recommendations so that they might not
be repeated. It is the enhancement of safety, and not the appor-
tionment of blame, that is the goal of the independent accident
investigation.
C. INDEPENDENCE OF THE INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY
Independence, autonomy, and technical excellence are im-
portant in order for the investigator to be-and be perceived
as-objective, impartial, and free from political influence and
the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest." Credi-
bility of the investigating organization vis-A-vis all interested and
concerned parties depends on competence, integrity, neutrality,
3 Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations,
1996, S.I. 1996/2798, 1 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/sil996/
Uksi_19962798_en_2.htm#mdivl (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
3 Australia Transport Safety Investigation Act, 2003 §7.3; see also id. § 15
(granting the Executive Director independence from the Secretary of
Transport).
See, e.g., George Tompkins & Andrew Harakas, ICAO and Aviation Accident
Investigation, 19(2) ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 375 (1994).
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and independence.3 8 Credibility is essential if the recommenda-
tions for corrective action based on lessons learned from safety
accidents and incidents are to be accepted and implemented.
Annex 13 provides that "the accident investigation authority
shall have independence in the conduct of the investigation and
have unrestricted authority over its conduct. . . ."" The investi-
gation consists of the gathering, recording, and analyzing all
available relevant information and, if possible, determining the
cause(s) and completing the Final Report followed by, where
appropriate, the making of safety recommendations. 40 Note
however, that although Annex 13 calls for "independence in the
conduct of the investigation," it does not mandate institutional
independence of the investigatory body. It may be that certain
States are too small, or too financially restricted, to establish a
separate governmental institution focused on accident
investigations.
In auditing State compliance with SARPs, ICAO insists:
A State's primary aviation legislation should contain provisions to
enable the Government and its administration to conduct or par-
ticipate in aircraft incident and accident investigations which may
be vested in an independent or separate body. . . . The State
should establish an investigation authority to be responsible for
the conduct of accident and incident investigations.4 1
ICAO's Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigations
provides: "The accident investigation authority must be strictly
objective and totally impartial and must also be perceived to be
so. It should be established in such a way that it can withstand
political or other interference or pressure."4 2 As the E.U. has
observed, the accident investigation body should be function-
ally, operationally, and financially separate from the civil avia-
tion administration responsible for "airworthiness, certification,
flight operation, maintenance, licensing, air traffic control or
3 Abraham, supra note 13, at 28-29.
3 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.4; DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 58.
40 Annex 13, supra note 3, ch. 1 (defining "Investigation").
41 ICAO, AUDIT REPORT OF THE AusTRAiAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BuREAu (ATSB)
OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/36732/ICAO-audit.pdf (last vis-
ited May 12, 2010) (emphasis added).
42 ICAO, Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation: Part I-Organiza-
tion and Planning, ICAO Doc. 9756 (2000).
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airport operations," or any other institution that might conflict
with the tasks ascribed to the accident investigator."
Annex 13 recommends that States establish a voluntary inci-
dent-reporting system. 4 It also insists that such a system be
"non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of the infor-
mation," because a "non-punitive environment is fundamental
to voluntary reporting."4 5 In its guidance material, ICAO ob-
serves, "Ideally, State-run voluntary incident reporting systems
are operated by an organization separate from the aviation ad-
ministration responsible for the enforcement of aviation regula-
tions." 4 6 Sometimes, the voluntary incident-reporting program
is run by the safety investigator (as in Australia, Canada, France,
Singapore, and Taiwan), whereas in others it is run by another
governmental institution.4 7 The important point is that it not be
run by the safety regulator.
As noted above, Annex 13 recommends that any court or ad-
ministrative action designed to apportion blame or impose lia-
bility should be autonomous from the accident or incident
investigation. 4 8 However, "[t] he State conducting the investiga-
tion shall recognize the need for coordination between the in-
vestigator-in-charge and the judicial authorities."" Generally,
most of the evidence5 0 gathered should remain confidential un-
less the judicial authorities determine "that their disclosure out-
weighs the adverse domestic and international impact such
43 Council Directive 94/56, art. 6.1, 1994 Q.S. (L 319/14) (EC) (establishing
the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents
and incidents). See also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, EUROPEAN AVIATION LAw 144-45
(2004).
4 Annex 13, supra note 3, 8.1.
45 Id. 8.3, note 1.
46 ICAO, supra note 8, at 6-6.
47 In the United States, it is administered by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). See, e.g., Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin.
[NASA], ASRS: The Case for Confidential Incident Reporting Systems, http://
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/60_CaseforConfidentialIncident-Reporting.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2010).
48 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.4.1 ("Recommendation.-Anyjudicial or admin-
istrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separate from any
investigation conducted under the provisions of this Annex.").
49 Id. 5.10.
50 Such evidence includes: "all statements taken by persons from the investiga-
tion authorities . .. ; all communications between persons having been involved
in the operation of the aircraft; medical or private information regarding persons
involved ... ; cockpit voice recordings and transcripts ... ; and . .. flight recorder
information." DEMPSEY, supra note 25 at 57.
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action may have on that or any future investigations . . . ."5 1 An-
nex 13 also recognizes that evidence gathered during the acci-
dent or incident investigation, including that given voluntarily,
"could be utilized inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary,
civil, administrative, and criminal proceedings. If such informa-
tion is distributed, it may, in the future, no longer be openly
disclosed to investigators. Lack of access to such information
would impede the investigation process and seriously affect
flight safety."" Hence, extreme caution is urged in using evi-
dence gathered for safety investigation purposes in liability or
punitive judicial or administrative proceedings, lest those in-
volved in an aviation accident be less willing to volunteer useful
information. These principles are reaffirmed in Attachment E
to Annex 13, addressing the disclosure of information gathered
during the safety investigation." Information so gathered may
be withheld from disclosure where it "would inhibit its contin-
ued availability."54
"The investigator-in-charge [H1C] shall have unhampered ac-
cess to the [evidence] and . . . unrestricted control over it to
ensure that a detailed [investigation] can be made without de-
lay." 5 Annex 13 also describes the appropriate relationship be-
tween the accident investigator and judicial authorities:
The State conducting the investigation shall recognize the need
for coordination between the investigator-in-charge and the judi-
cial authorities. Particular attention shall be given to evidence
which requires prompt recording and analysis for the investiga-
tion to be successful ....
Note 2.-Possible conflicts between investigating and judicial au-
thorities regarding the custody of flight recorders and their re-
cordings may be resolved by an official of the judicial authority
51 Annex 13, supra note 3, 5.12. See Ortiz & Capaldo, supra note 24, at 275;
see also Singer, supra note 24, at 506.
52 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.12.1 note 1; see also DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 57;
NTSB Bar Assoc., Aviation Professionals and the Threat of Criminal Liability-How Do
We Maximize Aviation Safety, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 875, 895, 901-02 (2002).
53 See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annex 13, Attach-
ment E, Legal Guidance for the Protection of Information from Safety Data Col-
lection and Processing Systems, available at http://www.icao.int/hyperdocs/
display.cfm?V=2&name=an-WP%2F8087&Lang=e.
54 Id. 1 3.1. Disclosure may be permitted where it would "not inhibit its future
availability in order to improve safety." Id. I 5.2(b). The release of information
to promote the proper administration of justice may be allowed if the "release
outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such release may have
on the future availability of safety information." Id. 4.1(c).
55 Id. 5.6.
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carrying the recordings to the place of readout, thus maintaining
custody. 5 6
D. PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION
Location determines which State shall conduct the investiga-
tion. The responsibility for conducting an investigation de-
pends on whether the location of the occurrence is:
* In the territory of an ICAO Contracting State;
* In the territory of a non-contracting State; or
* Outside the territory of any ICAO State.57
As noted above, Article 26 of the Chicago Convention re-
quires the State where the accident occurred (the State of Oc-
currence) to conduct the investigation. Under Annex 13, the
responsibility for an investigation also resides in the State where
the accident or incident occurred, though the Annex permits
the State of Occurrence to delegate the whole or part of the
investigation to another State. 9 If the event occurred outside
the territory of any State, then the State of registry shall conduct
the investigation. 0 The investigating State shall designate the
IIC.6" It also may recruit technical expertise from any source to
assist with the investigation.6 2
Article 26 provides that the State of aircraft registry may be
given the opportunity to appoint observers to the investiga-
tion.6" Annex 13 goes further. It provides that an accredited
representative may be appointed by the States of registry, opera-
tor, design, or manufacture to participate in the investigation.
"Any State which on request provides information, facilities, or
experts to the [investigating] State ... shall be entitled to ap-
point an accredited representative to participate in the
investigation."65
56 Id. 5.10.
57 DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 159.
58 Chicago Convention, supra note 5; DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 159.
59 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.1. The investigating State may delegate all or
part of the investigation to another State.
o Id. 1 5.3. "If the State of Registry is a non-Contracting State," the State of
the Operator, Design, or Manufacture should conduct the investigation. Id.
5.3.2.
61 Id. 5.5.
62 Id. 1 5.3.2.
63 Chicago Convention, supra note 5, art. 26.
6 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.18 note.
65 Id. 5.23. The State of Design or Manufacture of the power plant or major
component parts may request to participate in the investigation. Id. 1 5.18 note.
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At the discretion of the investigator, advisers proposed by the
operator, designer, or manufacturer may be engaged in the in-
vestigation.6 6 The investigator may also seek the assistance of
the air navigation service provider, airport operator, or any
other relevant party. 7 In fact, nothing precludes the investigat-
ing State, or any State participating in the investigation "from
calling upon the best technical expertise from any source . . ." to
assist in the investigation.6 " This sometimes means seeking ex-
pertise from the airline or aircraft manufacturer, who may have
expertise essential for the determination of probable cause.
One must be cautious, however, in using these resources, as air-
lines and manufacturers often are defendants in aviation catas-
trophe tort litigation and are increasingly subject to criminal
investigation as a result of the incident. Hence, they may not be
perfectly neutral and objective sources of information. Their in-
clusion in the investigation, though a necessary evil, may create
the appearance of impropriety, and therefore their expertise
must be limited to the provision of factual data and assistance in
the analysis of technologically complex facts. They should be
constrained from offering hypotheses as to the causes of the
accident.
Those who participate in the investigation have the right to
visit the accident scene, examine the wreckage, obtain witness
information, and suggest areas of questioning." They also have
the right to obtain full access to relevant evidence, to receive
copies of pertinent documents, to participate in media events,
to participate in off-scene investigative activities and investiga-
tion-progress meetings, and to make submissions.o They also
have the duties to provide the IIC with all relevant information
available to them, not to reveal information about the progress
and findings of the investigation to the public without permis-
sion of the IIC, and to refrain from reporting to their States
except as necessary "to facilitate appropriate safety actions."
Chapter 4 of Annex 13 provides that all States that are eligible
to participate in the investigation must be notified of the acci-
dent or incident promptly.72 States whose citizens have died in
66 Id. 5.19.
67 Id. 1 5.24.







an accident also may appoint an expert to participate in the in-
vestigation." Chapter 3 explains how the investigating State
shall address requests from other States to participate in the
investigation.74
E. THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS
Chapter 5 of Annex 13 describes the investigation process. 7 5
The process includes establishing the investigation team; gather-
ing, recording, and analyzing the relevant evidence including
reconstruction of the event; determining the causes of the acci-
dent or incident; formulating safety recommendations; and pre-
paring the Final Report. 6
ICAO maintains a reporting system known as the Accident/
Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system, which facilitates the
exchange of safety information. Chapter 7 prescribes that the
reporting requirements of the ADREP system are to be done by
means of Preliminary and Accident/Incident Data Reports.
F. OTHER PROVISIONS
Chapter 5 of Annex 13 also includes provisions addressing the
designation of the IIC, the use of flight recorders, autopsy exam-
inations, coordination with judicial authorities, communication
with aviation security authorities, disclosure of records, and the
possibility of re-opening of an investigation.
Chapter 6 addresses the development and issuance of the Fi-
nal Report." The model format for the Final Report is set forth
in an Appendix. Draft reports are sent for comments to the
States of registry, design, and manufacture, and the operator. 2
Comments received within sixty days of transmission must be in-
73 Id. 5.27.
74 Id. 3.3.
75 See generally id. ch. 5.
76 Id. 5.4. Procedures are set forth in Annex 13-ICAO Doc. 9756-Manual
of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, and ICAO Doc 9156-Accident/lnci-
dent Reporting Manual. Id. ch. 4 note 2, ch. 7 note 3. Chapter 5 of Annex 13 also
provides for participation by the States of Registry, the Operator, Design, and
Manufacture, as well as States having suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its
citizens. Id. 5.18, 5.27.
77 Id. It 7.5, 7.6.
78 Id. ch. 7 note 2.
79 See generally id. ch. 5.
so See generally id. ch. 6.
81 Id. 6.1
82 Id. 1 6.3.
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corporated in, or if disagreed with, appended to, the Final Re-
port. 3 The Final Report shall be distributed to those same
States as well as any State which, on request, provides informa-
tion, facilities, or experts to the investigating State, any State
that has a special interest in an accident because of the fatalities
or serious injury of its citizens, and to the State that instituted
the investigation."
Chapter 8 addresses accident prevention measures, including
mandatory and voluntary incident reporting systems, and the
desirability of a non-punitive atmosphere to encourage the vol-
untary reporting of safety hazards." Chapter 8 also addresses
database systems and the analysis of database safety data.8 6 It
recommends that States establish safety information sharing net-
works to facilitate the exchange of information on safety
deficiencies."
G. STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE OBLIGATIONS
The Chicago Convention obliges the 190 ratifying States to
implement the standards promulgated by ICAO in Annexes to
the Convention through their legislation, regulations, policies,
and organizational structures, unless they find it "impracticable
to comply," in which case they must immediately notify ICAO."8
The legislation typically defines the jurisdiction, powers, and in-
dependence of the investigation body, implements Annex 13
standards, and provides penalties for obstructing the investiga-
tion and for unauthorized disclosure. Among the powers con-
ferred to investigation agencies are:
* To have access to the accident aircraft or wreckage, flight re-
corders, and air traffic control records;
* To have access to relevant records;
* To require persons to answer questions or furnish
information;
* To require the aircraft or wreckage to be preserved pending
examination;
* To examine and test an aircraft or any part thereof; and
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 160; Shubert, supra note 3, at 19.
86 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 8.1, 8.6.
87 Id. 1 8.9.
- Chicago Convention, supra note 5, art. 38.
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* To require autopsy, medical, or toxicological examinations
on crew members, passengers, and others involved."
States are highly motivated to comply with SARPs contained
in Annexes by ICAO, as they are now audited for their compli-
ance9 o and the results of such audits are made public." The
following section of this article examines several States' imple-
mentation of Annex 13.
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING
INDEPENDENCE OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION AUTHORITIES
One source notes that, "Perhaps the most important prerequi-
site of public and industry trust is independence . . . . An inde-
pendent accident investigation body ensures that there can be
no perception of conflict of interest which reduces the scope for
'cover-up' or conspiracy theories."9 2
This section examines the laws and policies of several States
on the:
* Technical role. The independence of investigation authorities
responsible for airworthiness, certification, flight operation,
maintenance, licensing, air traffic management, or airport
operation; and
* Social role: The independence of investigation authorities
from any party whose interests or mandates could conflict
with the independence of the investigation or could influence
its objectivity.
In particular, it addresses the level of participation of some
parties and their access to investigation data, particularly when
these parties are participating in the Annex 13 investigation and
are simultaneously plaintiff or defense litigants in a parallel judi-
cial inquiry." This section also examines the organizational
structures of several national safety investigation authorities and
the extent to which they have been made autonomous from
89 Annex 13, supra note 3, 11 5.9, 5.9.1. Siew Huay Tan, Dir. Legal, Civil Avia-
tion Auth. of Sing., Address Before the Singapore Aviation Academy: Accident
Investigation (June 7, 2007) (notes on file with author).
90 ICAO, Safety Oversight Audit Manual, at 3-1, Doc. 9735-AN/960 (2d ed. 2006).
91 Dempsey, supra note 23, at 29-30.
92 K. Smart, Credible Investigation of Air Accidents, 111 J. HAZARDous MATERIALS
112 (2004).
93 See Bernard M. Deschenes, The Canadian Aviation Safety Board: Experiences in
International Co-Operation and Adaption, 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 3 (1987).
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other governmental institutions and investigations or
litigation.94
At the outset, one observes that formal autonomy and inde-
pendence are common among many States' accident investiga-
tion bodies, including:
* Australia Aviation Safety Board
* The Netherlands Accident Investigation Bureau
* New Zealand Accident Investigation Commission
* U.S. National Transportation Safety Board15
Other accident investigation bodies that enjoy nominal de-
pendence but factual independence include:
* U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch;
* BEA France; and
* German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation.9
Some States, such as the U.S., established politically-ap-
pointed boards that supervise a bureaucratic superstructure.
Others, such as Sweden and Finland, place the organization
within the Ministry of Justice." The Netherlands adopted an-
other model still-" [a] small number of professional investiga-
tors who are supported by a large [b]oard drawn from experts
across transport modes."" Because of financial constraints,
some developing States placed their investigation units within
the Civil Aviation Authority, or have established an ad hoc inves-
tigation commission to deal with an occasional accident, while
others delegate the task to developed States.100 Several States in
Central America, troubled by the absence of independence of
the accident investigation bodies from their respective civil avia-
tion authorities, have proposed the establishment of a regional
commission responsible for accident and incident investigation,
paralleling their regional safety regulator, COCESNA.ox
4 Id. at 3-5, 11.
95 Stoop & Kahan, supra note 30, at 119.
96 Id.
97 Nigel Moll, Board Members Letter Reveals Strife at NTSB, http://www.iasa.
com.au/folders/safety_issues/RiskManagement/NTSBnewstrife.html (last visited
May 11, 2010).
98 Smart, supra note 92, at 113.
99 Id.
100 ICAO, Accident Investigation and Prevention Divisional Meeting: Creation of a
Commission Responsible for the Investigation of Accidents and Serious Incidents in Central
America, 1 1.3, ICAO Working Paper AIG/08-WP/48 (2008), available at http://
www.icao.int/AIGdivO8/docs/AIGdivO8_WP48_revlen.pdf.
101 See id. COCESNA is the Corporaci6n Centroamericana de Servicios de
Navegaci6n Area (Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services). See gen-
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In several instances, an investigative body has been removed
from the State's transport department and made independent
following aviation catastrophes that have called into question
the credibility of the investigator. 0 2 For example:
* A prominent crash of a TWA aircraft in 1931, and the public
perception of incompetence, secrecy, and conspiracy led the
U.S. Congress to require that reports on the probable cause
of fatal air crashes be made public."os A 1935 crash led Con-
gress to establish an independent investigatory body, a prede-
cessor of today's NTSB.' 0 4
* The Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) was created after
a formal inquiry was made concerning the efforts of senior
officials of the transportation department who attempted to
taint an investigation of a 1978 Boeing 737 crash.' 0 5 In turn,
the CASB was sunset by the Canadian Parliament in 1989, fol-
lowing an Air Ontario crash on takeoff in Dryden, Ontario,
which killed twenty-one of the sixty-five passengers, and three
of the four crew members, and the perceived mishandling of
the Arrow Air disaster investigation three and a half years ear-
lier at Gandor, Newfoundland, in which 278 U.S. military per-
sonnel and crew died.1'0 A Commission of Inquiry was
convened, chaired by the Honorable Virgil P. Moshansky,
which issued two interim reports and a four-volume investiga-
tive report including 191 safety recommendations.' 0 7
Moshansky found that the competitive pressure created by
airline deregulation had eroded safety standards.' 08 He
blamed Transport Canada for allowing Air Ontario to expand
into using larger, more complicated aircraft without detecting
the deficiency of its existing fleet."0 ' These accidents led to
the creation of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
(TSB).110
erally COCESNA, http://www.cocesna.org/index.php?lng=1 (last visited May 11,
2010).
102 Sumwalt, supra note 34.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Ken Johnson, Executive Dir., Transp. Safety Bd. of Can. (TSB), Address at
the Flight Safety Conference (Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/
eng/medias-media/discours-speeches/2000/kenjohnson taiwan.asp.
106 Honorable Virgil P. Moshansky, Address at the Canadian Health Care





110 137 PARL. DEB., SEN. (1st Sess.) (1988) 58 (Can.) (statements of Hon. Mira
Spivak).
2432010]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
* A 1992 Parliamentary inquiry in the Netherlands led to the
creation of an autonomous investigation unit following an ac-
cident investigation involving an El Al Boeing 747 that
crashed into two apartment buildings."'
* A 1979 DC-10 crash into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, by an Air
New Zealand DC-10, resulting in 257 fatalities (the worst dis-
aster in New Zealand history), led to both a traditional acci-
dent investigation and a parallel Royal Commission of
Inquiry." 2 The investigators reached different results." 3
The chief accident investigator, Ron Chippendale, issued a
report in 1980 finding that the aircraft had flown into the
mountain in whiteout conditions "soon after the ground
proximity warning had sounded.""' He faulted "the airline
for inadequate pilot briefings and procedures" (including
failing to notify the crew of a late flight path alteration), criti-
cized "the Civil Aviation Division for not monitoring Antarctic
flights more rigorously," and blamed the pilots "for descend-
ing to a low altitude when [they were] unsure of [their] posi-
tion and unable to see the terrain.""' But High CourtJudge
Peter Mahon, leading a royal commission of inquiry, reached
a different conclusion in 1981, issuing a report finding that
Air New Zealand "was primarily to blame [for] changing the
flight plan without telling the crew," thus putting the aircraft
on a trajectory towards Mt. Erebus instead of McMurdo
Sound."' Judge Mahon harshly condemned Air New Zea-
land for "mis [leading] the inquiry through an 'orchestrated
litany of lies.""" The airline sought judicial review. A court
of appeal concluded that Mahon had exceeded his authority
in suggesting criminal conspiracy, a decision upheld by the
Privy Council."s This experience led to the creation of the
New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission
(TAIC)." 9
Ill NEDERLANDS AVIATION SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT 92-11: EL
AL FLIGHT 1862, at 8 (1994), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/2460079/
Aircraft-accident-report-9211-El-Al-Flight-1862-Boeing-747258F-4XAXG-Bijlmerm
eer-Amsterdam-October4-1992.
112 Te Ara, The 1979 Erebus Crash, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/air-crashes/







119 Johnson, supra note 105.
244 [ 75
SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITIES
* In Nigeria, an autonomous accident body was created in the
Civil Aviation Act of 2006, following a series of aviation
accidents. 120
Though aviation-safety policy and law has often been driven
reactively by catastrophic incidents, the modern approach at-
tempts to be more proactive through the use of scientific risk-
management principles, best practices, shared safety data, ana-
lyzed incidents, and by encouraging pilots and machinists to re-
port hazards in a non-punitive environment.12 1
Several States have created independent boards to oversee ac-
cident investigations. 12 2 These include Australia, Canada, Fin-
land, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.'2 1 Often, the board members
are appointed for a term of office (e.g., five years), and, to en-
sure their independence, they may be removed from office only
for cause. 12 4
Though some accident-investigation agencies are focused
solely on aviation, many are multimodal accident-investigation
organizations. 125 Established in 1967, the U.S. NTSB became
the first multimodal accident-investigation agency in the
world.1 2 6 Multimodal boards have since been established in Aus-
tralia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and New Zea-
land.12 7 One source notes that, "Establishing such multi-modal
boards is frequently initiated by parliamentary interference after
one or more major events, which disrupt public confidence in
120 Akin Obasa, Pioneering a New Aviation Safety Regime, THE NEWS (May 26,
2008), http://thenewsng.com/news/pioneering-a-new-aviation-safety-regime/
2008/05.
121 ICAO ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY ROADMAP 1-4
(2006), available at http://www.icao.int/FSIX/_Library%5CGlobal-Aviation
SafetyRoadmapPart_2.pdf.




124 Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Oper-
ation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1111, 1138 (2000).
125 Pieter van Vollenhoven, Independent Accident Investigation - The Right of Each
Citizen and Society's Duty, 33 JAPAN RAILWAY & TRANSPORT REv. 14, 14 (2002),
http://wwwjrtr.net/jrtr33/pdf/fl4_vol.pdf.
126 ITSA - International Transportation Safety Association, History, http://
www.itsasafety.org/images/uploads/History-ofITSA.pdf (last visited May 11,
2010).
127 van Vollenhoven, supra note 125.
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the transport systems."128 Public confidence in the safety and
security of the transport sector is essential to the efficient and
proper performance of transport networks that serve the pub-
lic's need for travel.
Often, the aviation model is adapted to other modes
because it has been able to establish public and industry trust
[in] its ability to conduct thorough and objective investigation
into the circumstances of aircraft accidents. This trust extends to
a confidence that the process will swiftly address the public safety
issues arising from any accident while . . . meeting the needs of
survivors and bereaved families by keeping them updated on the
progress of the investigation.' 2
We now turn to an examination of several States' accident in-
vestigation organizational forms.
A. AuSTRALMA
Australian air carriers are subject to certification and regula-
tion by the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
under a number of Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs).s
CASA sets safety standards and monitors compliance by the air
carriers.' 3 1 Since its creation as a multimodal safety bureau in
1999 (incorporating the former Bureau of Air Safety Investiga-
tion), accident investigations have been conducted by the Aus-
tralian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Australia's
independent agency for transportation safety investigations.13 2
Operating under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003
(TSI Act), ATSB has jurisdiction to investigate aviation, marine,
and interstate rail accidents.'13  Consolidating the various modal
safety-investigation agencies into a multimodal agency was
thought desirable to ensure a "more efficient use of resources,"
a greater pool of resources available to meet needs during peri-
128 Stoop & Kahan, supra note 30, at 123.
12 Smart, supra note 92, at 111.




132 Carol Boughton, Dir. Safety Investigations, Australian Transp. Safety Bu-
reau (ATSB), Address Before the Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air
Safety Investigators: The ATSB: What Does It Mean for Aviation Safety? 1, 3 (June
10-11, 2000), available at http://asasi.org/papers/atsb.pdf.
133 Transport Safety Investigation (TSI) Act 2003 § 11 (Austrl.). Investigations
prior to June 30, 2003, were conducted under the Air Navigation Act 1920. Id.
§ 106.
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ods of unexpected workloads, better career opportunities for
staff, benefit from cross-fertilization of expertise and proce-
dures, a more interesting work mix, and "better use of common
resources." 3 4 The TSI Act gives the ATSB Executive Director
jurisdiction to report transportation safety matters, to conduct
blameless safety investigations, to make safety recommenda-
tions, to protect and disseminate information, and to publish
investigation results.' 5 Investigations are explicitly required to
be "independent."13 6
ATSB is an operationally-independent body within the Austra-
lian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Re-
gional Development and Local Government, and is Australia's
prime agency for transport safety investigations.' 3 7 The bureau
is entirely separate from transport regulators and service provid-
ers." As Carol Boughton, Director of ATSB Safety Investiga-
tions, observed, "In terms of independence from the aviation
industry, such independence must be balanced against a sound
and robust relationship with the numerous parties in the indus-
try."' 3 9 The ATSB and CASA have a common mission of enhanc-
134 Boughton, supra note 132, at 1.
135 See generally TSI Act, pts. 4-6.
136 Id. § 12AA.
137 ATSB, Minister's Statement of Expectations, http://www.atsb.gov.au/
about atsb/corporate/ministers-statement-of-expectations.aspx (last visited May
11, 2010). The ATSB was officially established on July 1, 1999. ATSB, ATSB An-
nual Review 2002, http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2002/annual review
2002.aspx (last visited May 11, 2010). Section 12AB of the TSI Act provides that
"the ATSB is not subject to direction from anyone in relation to the performance
of its functions of the exercise of its powers." TSI Act § 12AB.
The ATSB Executive Director is currently supported by a Director
Safety Investigations Branch and a Director Safety Research and Ed-
ucation Branch. The Safety Investigations Branch (SIB) is cur-
rently supported by a Deputy Director Aviation Safety Investigation
and a Deputy Director Surface Safety Investigation. Aviation inves-
tigation responsibilities are carried out by two teams referred to as
the Green Team and the Red Team; each led by a team leader that
reports to the Deputy Director Aviation Safety Investigation.
ICAO, supra note 41, 1 5.3.2.2.
Ms Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Austra-
lian Transport Safety Bureau: A Leader in Accident Investigation, http://www.
dfat.gov.au/facts/transport safety.html (last visited May 29, 2009). These in-
clude the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Maritime Safety Author-
ity, Airservices Australia (the air navigation service provider), rail authorities, and
of course, other parties that are investigated. Id.
139 Boughton, supra note 132, at 3.
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ing aviation safety, but the means by which they advance that
objective are quite different.'4 0 The ATSB promotes safety,
by producing independent, high quality, accident and incident
reports and safety recommendations from which important
safety lessons for the future can be learned. CASA does so, in
part, by drawing on the learning the ATSB's investigation reports
and safety recommendations provide and applying that learning
to maintain, enhance and promote aviation safety.'
The ATSB's mission is to "maintain[ ] and improve[ ] trans-
port safety and public confidence through excellence in" inde-
pendent transport accident and incident investigation, safety
data analysis and research, and safety communication and edu-
cation. 14 2 On July 1, 2009, to enhance its independence, ATSB
became a statutory agency separate from the department.'
The ATSB enjoys "organisational separation from transport
regulators such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Austra-
lian Maritime Safety Authority, Airservices Australia (Australia's
air traffic service provider), rail authorities, and other parties
that may need to be investigated." 4 4 The TSI Act updated the
ATSB's jurisdiction over aviation and marine investigation, and
extended it to include the interstate rail network.14 5 The Act
also reinforced "the ATSB's operational independence to con-
duct 'no blame' safety investigations."4 6 The TSI Act provides
that "the Executive Director [of Transport Safety Investigation]
is not subject to directions from the Minister or the Secretary in
respect of the exercise of the Executive Director's powers under
this Act."1 47
Though Australia filed a difference with ICAO on Annex 13,
"reserving the right to remove a participant from an investiga-
tion if such a participant contravened the agreed conditions of
participation," the ICAO audit team responded that "the spirit
of Annex 13 was full cooperation between the States and the
participants involved, and full adherence to Annex 13," and that
140 See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
141 ATSB/CASA REVIEw 2007, supra note 26, 1 19.1.
142 ATSB, Mission Statement, http://www.atsb.gov.au/about-atsb/corporate/
mission.aspx (last visited May 5, 2010).
143 TSI Act 2003 § 12 (Austl.).
14 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 138.
'4 Id.
146 Id.
'47 The Executive Director is explicitly not subject to direction by the Minister
or Secretary of Transport. TSI Act 2003 § 15 (Austrl.).
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the filing of such a difference was unnecessary.' Moreover, the
audit team noted that, "subject to a consultation with the State
that appointed an accredited representative or an adviser, that
State could be expected to replace or withdraw" its uncoopera-
tive representative or advisor, thus making removal
unnecessary.14 9
B. CANADA
Originally, the investigation of transportation accidents in Ca-
nada was performed by the transportation regulatory agencies.
Ken Johnson, Director of the Canada's Transportation Safety
Board, observed:
Gradually, the public began to note, particularly in aviation, that
the regulator (the Department of Transport) set the safety stan-
dards for the industry, operated elements of the system such as
airports and air traffic control, licensed the carriers and the
crews, and enforced its regulations. At the same time, it analysed
the safety features of the industry in which it had such a pervasive
presence. The public began to doubt the appropriateness of the
system and later began to ask for some reforms .... [It was ob-
served that] there was a conflict of interest when the regulator
operated much of the air transport system and also analysed its
failures.150
In February, 1978, a Boeing 737 crashed in western Canada
causing numerous fatalities.' After the investigation, the inves-
tigators were accused of incompetence and destruction of evi-
dence. 5 2 As a consequence, the government appointed ajudge
to conduct an inquiry.'5 3 The inquiry lasted two years.' 5 4 The
report concluded that attempts had been made at higher levels
in the Department of Transport to influence the accident inves-
tigators' work.' 5 Thejudge recommended creation of an "inde-
pendent federal agency to investigate aviation accidents and
148 ICAO, supra note 41 1 5.1.3.5.
149 Id.
150 Ken Johnson, Dir., Transp. Safety Bd. of Can. (TSB), Remarks at the Flight
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incidents.""' In 1984, the Canadian government created the
Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) as an independent
agency with a mandate to investigate incidents, accidents, and
hazards associated with aircraft operation.'5 7
Another significant Canadian investigation took place after an
Arrow Air DC-8 accident at Gander, Newfoundland, in which
278 U.S. military personnel and air crew died.' "The [CASB]
initiated an investigation immediately after the Dryden
crash."15 9 In response to "widespread public outrage . .. over
[the] CASB's perceived mishandling of the Arrow Air DC-8
crash at Gander," the Canadian Parliament sunset the agency on
March 29, 1989.160 Simultaneously, on that date, a commission
of inquiry, chaired by the Honorable Judge Moshansky, "was es-
tablished under the Inquiries Act to take over the investigation
of the Dryden crash from the . . . defunct CASB." 61 As noted
above, this led to organizational changes designed to restore the
credibility of the aviation accident investigation process in
Canada. 162
This inquiry presented an opportunity for an independent
body "to examine the entire Canadian aviation system for orga-
nizational failures, both latent and active, which might have con-
tributed to the Captain's faulty decision," and to make
recommendations for necessary change.6 The report issued
191 safety recommendations-mostly related to ground ice pro-
cedures, de-icing, de-icing fluids, and training-all of which
were accepted.'
The Canadian Transportation and Safety Board Act of 1989
folded the Aviation Safety Board into a new and independent
multimodal independent federal agency-the Canadian Trans-
156 Id.
157 Id.





16s Robert G. Evans et al., Italy Reliability Versus High Autonomy: Dryden, Murphy
and Patient Safety, HEALTICARE POLIcy, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.
longwoods.com/content/ 18240.
6 This report has become a landmark in accident investigation reporting and
has also influenced causal models. For example, this report has been used to
illustrate the Swiss Cheese Model. James Reason's model of accident causation
reveals the various human contributions to the breakdown of a complex system
and its application to a de-identified scenario adapted from the Dryden accident.
Id.
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portation Safety Board (TSB). Headed by a Board of five and a
staff of more than 200,165 Canada's TSB investigates the causes
and contributing factors of aviation, rail, commodity pipeline,
and marine accidents, incidents, and occurrences.1 6 6 The Act
provides that TSB shall conduct independent investigations,
identify safety deficiencies, make recommendations designed to
reduce such deficiencies, and report publicly on its investigation
and findings. 1 6  The statute also clearly states that in making its
findings as to the causes of an incident or accident, TSB shall
not assign fault or determine liability."'s The TSB is designed to
advance transportation safety; its activities are separate from the
courts. "Two key features of the Act are the TSB's indepen-
dence from regulatory bodies and other governmental depart-
ments and the common approach to occurrence investigations
across all" modes of transport."
165 Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), Background, http://www.
tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/fiches-facts/bst-tsb.asp (last visited May 5, 2010).
16 TSB, Welcome to the TSB, http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/index.asp (last vis-
ited May 5, 2010).
167 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act 1
7(1), 1989 S.C., ch. 3 (Can).
168 Id. Paragraph 7 provides: Object of the Board
(1) The object of the Board is to advance transportation safety by
(a) conducting independent investigations, including, when neces-
sary, public inquiries, into selected transportation occurrences in
order to make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;
(b) identifying safety deficiencies as evidenced by transportation
occurrences;
(c) making recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce any
such safety deficiencies; and
(d) reporting publicly on its investigations and on the findings in
relation thereto.
Restriction
(2) In making its findings as to the causes and contributing factors
of a transportation occurrence, it is not the function of the Board
to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability, but the Board
shall not refrain from fully reporting on the causes and contribut-
ing factors merely because fault or liability might be inferred from
the Board's findings.
Idem
(3) No finding of the Board shall be construed as assigning fault or
determining civil or criminal liability.
Id. 1 7.
169 DAVID JOHANSEN, LAW & GOV'T Div., BILL S-2: AN Acr TO AMEND THE CANA-
DIAN TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND SAFETY BOARD Acr AND TO
MAKE A CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT TO ANOTHER Acr (1997), available at http://
dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/LS/361/s2-e.htm (last vis-
ited May 5, 2010).
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Today, Transport Canada1 7 0 functions as an independent,
arm's length safety regulator.1 7 ' The corporatized and indepen-
dent NAV CANADA provides air navigation services.'1 7  Major
airports in Canada have been corporatized, and its flag carrier,
Air Canada, has been privatized.
In its Annual Report, the TSB emphasized the importance of
independence in the performance of transportation accident
investigations:
To encourage public confidence in transportation accident in-
vestigation, the investigating agency must be, and be seen to be,
objective, independent, and free from any conflicts of interest.
The key feature of the TSB is its independence. It reports to
Parliament through the President of the Queen's Privy Council
for Canada and is separate from other government agencies and
departments. Its independence enables it to be objective in arriv-
ing at its conclusions and recommendations. The TSB's continu-
ing independence and credibility rest on its competence,
openness, and integrity and the fairness of its processes.1 7 1
One TSB Board member described the organization in these
terms: "The TSB is an independent body that investigates acci-
dents with the purpose of advancing safety . . . and to report
publicly on our investigations. Our focus is straightforward. We
examine what happened; why it happened; and how we can help
ensure it never happens again. "174 Another Board member ad-
dressed the issue of independence of the TSB from those di-
rectly involved in an accident:
The independence of accident investigation authorities must not
be put at risk or perceived as such. Our role remains to report
findings to the public in an impartial and unbiased way, with the
sole aim of advancing transportation safety. Without this inde-
170 Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Portfolio, Government of
Canada, http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/menu.htm.
171 TSB, Investigation Process, http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-
investigations/investigation-process.pdf.
172 NAV CANADA, http://www.navcanada.ca/NavCanada.asp?Language=en&
content=contentdefinitionfiles/aboutus/default.xml.
173 TSB, Annual Report to Parliament 2003-2004, http://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/
publications/ann/2004/2003-2004.asp#5.0; see also TSB, Annual Report to Parlia-
ment 2005-2006, http://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/publications/ann/2006/2005-2006.
asp; TSB, Annual Report to Parliament 2007-2008, http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/
publications/ann/2008/2007-2008.asp.
174 Wendy A. Tadros, Bd. Member of TSB, Address to the Empire Club of Ca-
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pendence the TSB could not-expect any party involved in an inci-
dent to provide us with full disclosure. But does that mean we
cannot dialogue with industry and regulators? Not at all. The
key is to share information, not responsibilities.17 5
TSB's governing statue also provides:
[I]t is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine
civil or criminal liability, but the Board shall not refrain from
fully reporting on the causes and contributing factors merely be-
cause fault or liability might be inferred from the Board's find-
ings ..... No finding of the Board shall be construed as assigning
fault or determining civil or criminal liability.17 1
C. FRANCE
The Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la s6curit6 de
l'aviation civile (BEA) was established "in 1946 to investigate ac-
cidents, conduct inquiries and prepare reports."1 7 7 BEA enjoys
a statutory guarantee that, "In the context of the investigation,
the permanent organisation and the members of the commis-
sion act entirely independently and neither ask for, nor receive
instructions from any authority, nor from any organisation
whose interests may be in conflict with the mission with which
they are entrusted."1 7 ' The "any authority" language includes the
French Minister of Civil Aviation.
Further, the law provides that a technical investigation per-
formed by BEA shall not be conducted in such a way as to estab-
lish individual or collective guilt but shall instead be focused on
information likely to prevent future accidents.' 7 1 Specifically,
the statute provides that the accident investigation, "shall have,
as its sole objective, the collection and analysis of useful informa-
tion, the determination of the circumstances and the causes or
probable causes of the accident or incident, and if necessary, the
issuing of safety recommendations, with the intention of
175 Terry Burch, Dir. Gen. TSB, Address to the International Airline Passengers
Association (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/ENG/medias-
media/discours-speeches/2004/TBurtch Toronto_20040428.asp.
176 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act 1
7(2)-(3), 1989 S.C., ch. 3 (Can.), available at http://lawsjustice.gc.ca/en/C-23.4/
Fulltext.html.
17 Abraham, supra note 13, at 29.
178 Law No. 99-243 of Mar. 29, 1999, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran-
aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 29, 1999, art. L711-2; see also Abra-
ham, supra note 13, at 29-31.
179 Abraham, supra note 13, at 30.
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preventing future accidents and incidents and, where applica-
ble, without prejudice to judicial inquiries.""'o However, there is
no equivalent to the "exclusionary provision" that prevents
NTSB reports from being admissible into a judicial proceed-
ing.18 1 Moreover, in France, a criminal proceeding sometimes
follows the BEA investigation.1 2 The criminalization of aviation
accidents has been criticized as deterring "witnesses from coop-
erating in the accident investigation because of a legitimate con-
cern that their testimony could be used against them in a
criminal prosecution.1 8 3
The Decree re-establishing the BEA states that
The director of the B.E.A. is nominated, for a period of seven
years, by order of the minister for civil aviation, following a pro-
posal from the head of the Inspectorate General for Civil Avia-
tion, from among those category A public servants with at least
twenty years professional experience in the field of civil
aviation.1 84
This seven year period is important as the French cycle of gov-
ernments is based on a five year period. So by definition, the
Director of the BEA will work for at least two different govern-
ments. Also, the Director is nominated on grounds of technical
expertise (20 years of professional experience as a civil servant
in the field of civil aviation) and not for political reasons.1 8 5
This is another guarantee of independence at the helm of the
permanent specialized investigatory organization. There are
also provisions on communications and confidentiality, impor-
tant in times of crisis lest information be released prema-
turely.-" The French Penal Code also "requires investigation
180 Law No. 99-243 of Mar. 29, 1999, Journal Officiel de la RCpublique Fran-
4aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 29, 1999, art. L711-1.
181 Simon Foreman, Aviation Accidents and the French Courts, 20 AIR & SPACE
LAw. 1, 16 (Fall 2005).
182 Id. at 14.
183 NTSB Bar Association, Aviation Professionals and the Threat of Criminal Liabil-
ity-How Do We Maximize Aviation Safety? 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 875, 901 (2002).
184 Law No. 99-243 of Mar. 29, 1999, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Fran-
raise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 29, 1999, art. R711-4 (as translated
by the author).
185 Law No. 99-243 of Mar. 29, 1999, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Fran-
caise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 29, 1999, art. R711-4.
186 Id. art. L731-1 relating to technical investigations into accidents and inci-
dents in civil aviation provides, inter alia:
I. The staff of the permanent organisation, field investigators,
members of Commissions of Inquiry and any technical experts
called upon are bound by professional secrecy under the condi-
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personnel, accident site investigators, commission members and
experts to observe strict confidentiality."' As noted above, con-
fidentiality is also mandated by Annex 13.88
However, accident investigations are complicated by the activ-
ism among the French judiciary and French prosecutors. Under
French law, if at least one plaintiff, at least one defendant, or the
insurer of the defendant is a French citizen, an action may lie in
French courts irrespective of the locale of the injury.189 French
courts also have no equivalent doctrine to forum non con-
veniens.19 o Moreover, French judges have the discretion to ap-
point an "expert" to gather evidence and issue a report, even
before a suit is filed."' In a civil case, the plaintiff pays for the
cost of the expert investigation; but in a criminal case, the cost is
borne by the government.19 2 Where passengers suffer death or
injury, it is common for a prosecutor immediately to launch a
criminal investigation for involuntary manslaughter to satisfy the
interests of both the public and the victims. 9 3 The judge has
the assistance of both an "expert" and special aviation police-
Gendarmerie du Transport Adrien-who may take witnesses into
custody and search premises."' Only one of the victims need be
tions and with the penalties defined in Article 226-13 of the Penal
Code.
II. As an exception to the preceding disposition, the head of the
permanent organisation is authorised to communicate information
established by the technical investigation, if he judges it to be perti-
nent to the prevention of an accident or serious incident, to the
administrative authorities responsible for the safety of civil aviation,
to persons responsible for aircraft or aircraft equipment manufac-
ture or maintenance, to individuals or legal entities responsible for
operating aircraft or for training personnel.
In addition, the head of the permanent organisation and, where
applicable, the presidents of Commissions of Inquiry are
authorised, within the context of their brief, to make public any
information on the findings of technical investigators, the proceed-
ings of the technical investigation and possibly its preliminary
conclusions.
187 Abraham, supra note 13, at 29-30; C. P9N. art. 226-13.
188 Bureau d'Enquates et d'Analyses Pour La Scurit6 de L'aviation Civile,
Judicial Framework, http://www.aero/en/bea/qui-sommes-nous/cadre-
juridique.php.
189 C. Civ art. 14.
190 Foreman, supra note 181, at 13.
191 Id. at 13-14.
192 Id. at 14.
19s Id.
194 Id. at 15.
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French for the courts to pursue a prosecution against defend-
ants, even those that reside abroad. 5
In 1988, an Airbus A320, flying low over the Paris Air Show,
crashed in a nearby forest. The investigators concluded there
was no technical problem with the aircraft and that the crash
had been caused by the pilot flying dangerously low. 9 6 The
flight recorder (i.e., black box) had been taken into custody by
BEA for analysis. The pilot, under investigation, alleged the
flight recorders had been tampered with by BEA to cover up a
defect in the aircraft. In 1999, the Civil Aviation Code was
amended to guarantee access by investigators to the wreckage
provided that the court is informed in advance and that appro-
priate measures are taken to preserve the evidence. 9 7 The re-
corders are placed under seal by the court, and BEA is allowed
to make a copy under the supervision of the police. Removal by
BEA of any wreckage from the scene of the accident also re-
quires permission from the investigating judge, and only non-
destructive tests may be performed.' These civil and criminal
investigations may go on for years after the BEA publishes its
report. One source notes:
No good can come from such a situation. It could progressively
lead the public to become wary of the overall system of aeronau-
tical safety, encourage operators and manufacturers to reduce
the reporting of incidents which are being used as evidence
against them, and discredit all the efforts that are conducted to
improve safety on an international level."99
D. IRELAND
The Irish statute on aviation accident investigations estab-
lished the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) as an autono-
mous organization "functionally independent" of any other
person or governmental institution whose interests could con-
flict with those of the AAIU.200 Its primary mission is to gather
195 Id. at 13.
196 Steven Greenhouse, Pilot Error is Blamed in Airbus Crash, N.Y. TIMES,June 28,
1988.
197 CODE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE [Code of Civil Aviation] art. L721-1 (Fr.).
198 CODE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE art. L721-3, L721-4.
199 Foreman, supra note 181, at 16.
200 Air Navigation (Notification and Investigation of Accidents and Incidents)
Regulations 1997 (S.I. No. 205 of 1997) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/1997/en/si/0205.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
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and analyze air safety data for accident and incident prevention
purposes.o1
E. NEw ZEALAND
As noted above, the Mount Erebus investigation was the cata-
lyst for the promulgation of the Transport Accident Investiga-
tion Commission Act of 1990, which created the New Zealand
Transportation Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC).
"TAIC is similar to a standing Commission of Inquiry."202 It was
given additional operational and financial independence in
2001 when it was designated for a funding line separate from
the Ministry of Transport and the modal safety authorities.os
Unlike Annex 13, under New Zealand law the main purpose (but
201 Air Navigation (S.I. No. 205 of 1997):
6(1) The Minister shall ensure that there is in the Department of
Transport, Energy and Communications a permanent civil aviation
body, to be known as the air Accident Investigation Unit, to carry
out the technical investigation of occurrences.
(2) The AAIU shall be functionally independent of the State avia-
tion authorities responsible for the operation or regulation of air-
worthiness, certification, flight operations, aircraft maintenance,
licensing, air traffic control or airport management, and in general
shall be independent of any other person or body whose interest
could conflict with the functions of the AAIU.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the functions of the AAIU may
be extended to the gathering and analysis of air safety data, in par-
ticular for accident or incident prevention purposes, in so far as
those functions do not affect its independence and entail no re-
sponsibility in regulatory, administrative or standards matters.
(4) The Minister shall ensure that the AAIU is given the means
necessary for it to perform its functions independent of the author-
ities referred to in paragraph (2).
(5) The Minister shall ensure that-
(a) the AAIU includes at least one inspector capable of performing
the function of investigator in charge in the event of an occur-
rence, and
(b) its members are afforded such status as is necessary to guaran-
tee its independence in the performance of its functions.
7(9) The investigator in charge shall be independent of any parties
involved in the accident or incident, and of the authorities referred
to in regulations 6(2) or any other body whose interests could con-
flict with the task entrusted to the investigator in charge.
202 Introduction to the Transport Accident Investigation Comm'n (TAIC),
http://www.taic.org.nz/AboutTAIC/IntroductiontoTAIC/tabid/155/Default.
aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
203 Ministry of Transport., Review of Transport Accident and Incident Investi-
gation (Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.nzmsg.co.nz/Review%200f%20Accident%20
and%20Investigation.pdf.
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not the "sole purpose") of the investigation is the determination
of causation.o4
TAIC is comprised of three commissioners and eleven staff
members.205 The agency describes its independence, and the
rationale therefore, in these terms:
TAIC is independent of all organisations and has an arm's-length
relationship with the Police, transport operators, transport regu-
latory authorities, unions, insurers and any other organisations
that may have some involvement in the investigation or in the
occurrence under investigation. This independence is seen by
the transport industry as making an important contribution to
TAIC's effectiveness in determining causes and making effective
recommendations to prevent similar accidents. 206
TAIC maintains that its independence is important for several
reasons: (1) independence enables TAIC to investigate and
comment impartially on any role the regulator or other groups
might have been able to play in preventing the accident; (2)
independence from the judicial and regulatory authorities al-
lows people involved in the accident to speak freely to investiga-
tors with the knowledge that the Commission cannot use that
information for enforcement, punishment, or corrective pur-
poses; (3) independence from judicial and regulatory authori-
ties ensures that any prosecution brought by them will not
compromise or delay TAIC's investigation and report on the ac-
cident; and (4) independence from other governmental institu-
tions gives TAIC full control over its reports.2 07 Alastair Bisley,
the New Zealand Secretary for Transport, observed:
A critical attribute of a transport accident and incident investiga-
tion system is that the investigating agency has no stake in the
system beyond its role as investigator and is independent of any
interested party. This is to avoid any conflict of interest or ap-
pearance of such.. .. [T]he agency should have no stake in the
design of legislative and administrative arrangements in place in
the sector or in the way in which they are managed and enforced.
The investigator would be shielded from pressure from any inter-
204 New Zealand's Compliance with the Standard and Recommended Practices
of Annex 13, http://www.caa.govt.nz/ICAO/Annex_13_Amd_11_CmpStmt.pdf
(last visited May 7, 2010).





ested party to reach a particular finding and would be objective,
and would be perceived to be So.208
Although Annex 13 urges the clear separation of investigatory
and judicial functions, and although many States have adopted
legislation explicitly prohibiting or limiting the use of investiga-
tory reports in civil and criminal judicial proceedings, the courts
in New Zealand have eroded the distinct lines between investiga-
tion and litigation.2 0 9
F. NIGERIA
The Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB) of Nigeria was estab-
lished as an autonomous safety investigatory unit by the Civil
Aviation Act of 2006, following a series of crashes during the
preceding two years.210 The purpose of making the AIB autono-
mous was to ensure its independence and efficiency.211 The
principal responsibility of the AIB is to perform independent
investigations into aviation accidents by determining their
causes and making safety recommendations to prevent future
occurrences without apportioning blame or liability.2 12 The AIB
was created, "To improve aviation safety by determining the cir-
cumstances and causes of air accidents and serious incidents
and making safety recommendations intended to prevent recur-
rence of similar accidents in [the] future . . . . It is not the pur-
pose of this activity to apportion blame or liability." 213 To assure
its independence, the Act provides that the AIB CEO "report
directly to the President and Commander-in-Chief through the
Minister of Air Transportation." 2 14
G. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) had its
beginnings in the Accident Investigation Branch (AIB) of the
208 Ministry of Transport, supra note 203.
209 See Sharif, supra note 24, at 339; see also DEMPSEY, supra note 25, at 55-61.
210 About Accident Investigation Bureau, http://aib.gov.ng/aboutus.aspx (last
visited June 5, 2010); Nigerian Civil Aviation Act - 2006, Nigeria Civil Aviation
Authority, http://www.ncaa.gov.ng/index.php/nigerian-civil-aviation-act (last vis-
ited June 5, 2010).
211 Engr Sam Oduselu, Comm'r of Accident Investigation, AIB, Speech at the
Closing Ceremony of Aircraft Accident Investigation Course at Cranfield Univ.,
United Kingdom (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://aib.gov.ng/cranfieldl.aspx.
212 Welcome to the Accident Investigation Bureau (Nigeria) Homepage, http:/
/aib.gov.ng/default.aspx (last visited June 5, 2010).
213 Id.
214 Obasa, supra note 120.
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Royal Flying Corps, established in 1915.215 The Air Navigation
Act of 1920 conferred upon the Secretary of State for Air juris-
diction to make regulations and investigate accidents.2 1 6 After
World War II, three separate government reviews of aircraft acci-
dent procedures and practices in the United Kingdom were con-
ducted, leading to the establishment of a Department of Civil
Aviation, to which the AIB was transferred.2 17 A common de-
nominator of all three of these committees of inquiry was that
"the independence of the accident investigation body should be
firmly established and recognised by the public and everyone
within the industry."2 1 8
In 1983, the AIB was transferred to the Department of Trans-
portation, and in 1987 its name was changed to the Air Acci-
dents Investigation Branch. 2 19  Although a part of the
Department, it is functionally independent, with the Chief In-
spector reporting directly to the Secretary of State for safety mat-
ters. 2 2 0 The purpose of the AAIB is to determine the causes of
accidents, and not to apportion blame or liability.22 ' The AAIB
and the surface transport safety investigation units of the British
government had signed a memorandum of understanding de-
fining their respective roles vis-a-vis the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice, calling for independence, cooperation, and
confidentiality.222
Following the separation of National Air Traffic Services from
the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in 2001, the CAA be-
came the United Kingdom's independent aviation regulator
that, as a single, specialist body, incorporates all civil aviation
regulatory functions-economic regulation, safety regulation,
airspace policy, and consumer protection.2 The CAA is a pub-
lic corporation originally established by Parliament in 1972 as
215 Stoop & Kahan, supra note 30, at 117.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Smart, supra note 92, at 113.
219 History of Air Accidents Investigations Branch, http://www.aaib.gov.uk/
about us/history.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
220 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Crown Prosecution Service
and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Marine Accident Investigation
Branch, and Rail Accident Branch, http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cmsjresources.
cfm?file=/MOU%20AIB-CPS.pdf (last visited May 7, 2010).
221 Welcome to the Accident Investigation Bureau (Nigeria) Homepage, supra
note 212.
222 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Crown Prosecution Service
and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, supra note 220.
223 Id.
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an "independent, specialist aviation regulator and provider of
air traffic services. "224 Today, it only retains its aviation-regulator
function (NATS is the service provider), being independent of
both the Department for Transport and political
interference.225
The AAIB's governing statute provides that, "The sole objec-
tive of the investigation of an accident or incident under these
Regulations shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents.
It shall not be the purpose of such an investigation to apportion
blame or liability." 2 26
H. THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. aviation market is sufficiently large that four agen-
cies have been created at the federal level to administer various
aspects of aviation. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) 22 handles aircraft accident investigations mandated
under Annex 13228 and administrative appeals of decisions of
224 The Civil Aviation Authority, http://www.caa.co.uk (last visited May 7,
2010). "The U.K. Government requires that the CAA's costs are met entirely
from its charges on those whom it regulates. Unlike many countries .. . there is
no direct Government funding of the CAA's work." About the Civil Aviation Au-
thority, http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=286 (last visited May 7, 2010).
225 Glen McDougall, ATC Commercialization Policy: Has it Been Effective? 48 J. AIR
TRAFFIc CONTROL 50, 50-55 (2006). It was also decided to separate the CAA
from political influence-there is a separate board and a requirement to act in-
dependently. While political interference has significantly been reduced, there is
always the possibility of interaction between Ministers and Board members.
Moreover, the military has a seat on the CAA Board and can require a CAA deci-
sion to be referred to the U.K. government if it disagrees with a Board decision.
However, to date this has not happened, even though such a possibility acts as a
safety net. Decisions can be judicially reviewed. Id.
226 The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regula-
tions, 1996, S.I. 1996/2798, art. 4 (U.K.).
227 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1101 (2007); 49 C.F.R §§ 800-31 (2009).
228 49 U.S.C. §§ 1131-32. The NTSB describes its responsibilities as follows:
The [NTSB] is the agency charged with fulfilling the obligations of
the United States under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation . . . consistent with State Department
requirements and in coordination with that department. Annex 13
contains specific requirements for the notification, investigation,
and reporting of certain incidents and accidents involving interna-
tional civil aviation. In the case of an accident or incident in a for-
eign state involving civil aircraft of U.S. registry or manufacture,
where the foreign state is a signatory to Annex 13 to the Chicago
Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
state of occurrence is responsible for the investigation. If the acci-
dent or incident occurs in a foreign state not bound by the provi-
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the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) .229 As described in greater detail below, the FAA regu-
lates the airlines, airmen, manufacturers, and airports, and di-
rectly provides air navigation services.
Though it has no authority to issue regulations, the NTSB
does have the responsibility to make regulatory recommenda-
tions to the FAA to avoid future accidents. 230 The Transporta-
tion Security Administration (TSA) of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security regulates aviation security.231 The Office of
sions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, or if the accident or
incident involves a public aircraft (Annex 13 applies only to civil
aircraft), the conduct of the investigation shall be in consonance
with any agreement entered into between the United States and the
foreign state.
Accident/Incident Investigation Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 3806 (Jan. 27, 1997);
49 C.F.R. § 831.
229 49 U.S.C. § 1131 provides:
(a) (1) The National Transportation Safety Board shall investigate
. . . and establish the facts, circumstances, and cause or probable
cause of-
A. an aircraft accident the Board has authority to investigate ...
B. a highway accident.. . the Board selects in cooperation with a
State;
C. a railroad accident in which there is a fatality or substantial
property damage, or that involves a passenger train;
D. a pipeline accident in which there is a fatality, substantial prop-
erty damage, or significant injury to the environment;
E. a major marine casualty (except a casualty involving only public
vessels) occurring on or under the navigable waters, internal wa-
ters, or the territorial sea of the United States . . . or involving a
vessel of the United States . . . ; and
F. any other accident related to the transportation of individuals or
property when the Board decides-
i. the accident is catastrophic;
ii. the accident involves problems of a recurring character; or
iii. the investigation of the accident would carry out this chapter.
(c) (2) The Board shall use the report in establishing cause or
probable cause of an accident described under subsection (a) or
(b) of this section.
(e) Accident reports. The Board shall report on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each accident investigated by it under subsection (a)
or (b) of this section. The Board shall make each report available
to the public at reasonable cost.
230 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, ROBERT HARDAWAY & WILLA THOMs, AVIATION
LAw & REGULATION § 12.67 (Butterworth 1993) [hereinafter DEMPSEY ET AL.].
231 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War against
Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 717-19 (2003).
SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITIES
the Secretary of Transportation (OST) within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (USDOT) has jurisdiction over eco-
nomic regulatory issues such as airline financial fitness,
competition policy, and consumer protection.2 3 2 The Secretary
of Transportation is statutorily commanded to assign and main-
tain safety as "the highest priority in air commerce."233
In 1931, a Trans World Airlines Fokker tri-motor crashed near
Bazaar, Kansas, killing all aboard including the popular Notre
Dame University football coach Knut Rockne. 3 4 The accident
investigation was perceived to have been shrouded "by incompe-
tence, secrecy, and conspiracy.""2 3  The U.S. Congress re-
sponded by amending the Air Commerce Act of 1926 to require
that reports on fatal aircraft crashed be made public."3
In 1935, a DC-2 crashed in Missouri, killing five persons in-
cluding U.S. Senator Bronson Cutting.2 3 7 This event led to the
1938 creation of an independent investigative body-the Bu-
reau of Safety-housed in the Civil Aeronautics Authority (the
agency was renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board two years
later).23
In the mid-1950s, a series of accidents brought to the surface
an underlying need for significant safety enhancement in avia-
tion. In 1956, a Trans World Airlines Constellation collided
with a United Airlines' DC-7 over the Grand Canyon."3 In early
1957, a Douglas Aircraft company-owned DC-7 collided with an
Air Force F-89 over Sunland, California. 24 0 The DC-7 crashed
into a junior high school, killing three and injuring seventy
22 For a review of the legislation passed by the United States to address avia-
tion issues, see PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAWRENCE E. GESELL, AIR COMMERCE &
THE LAW (Coast Aire 2004).
233 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a) (1).
23 See Accident Investigation, U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, http://
www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/GovernmentRole/accident-invest/POL1 7.
htm (last visited June 26, 2010).
235 See Sumwalt, supra note 34.
236 Id.
237 Id.
2- MARK HANSEN, CAROLYN MCANDREWS, & EMILY BERKELEY, FED. AvIATION AD-
MIN., DEP'T OF TRANsP., ANN. REP. 08/39, HISTORY OF AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2008).
239 Id. at 12.
24 Aviation Safety Network, Aircraft Accident Douglas DC-7B N8210H Sun-
land, CA, http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19570131-0 (last
visited May 11, 2010).
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others. 2 4 1 In 1958, a United Airlines' DC-7 collided with an Air
Force F-100 near Las Vegas, Nevada.2 4 2 The U.S. Congress re-
sponded with the promulgation of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958243 and the creation of the Federal Aviation Agency, later to
become the Federal Aviation "Administration" under the De-
partment of Transportation Act of 1966.244
The FAA was established by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
and subsequently became a part of the USDOT upon its crea-
tion in 1967.245 The FAA is headed by an Administrator, who is
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and serves for a term of five years. 2 4 6 The FAA Adminis-
trator is required to consider the maintenance and enhance-
ment of safety and security as among the highest priorities in
the public interest. 2 4 7 The FAA is charged with promoting avia-
tion safety, ensuring the safe and efficient utilization of the na-
tional airspace, 2 4 8 and providing oversight of the U.S. airport
system. 2 4 9 Although it does not own and operate airports (they
are owned and operated by local institutions, usually govern-
ments) ,21o the FAA issues airport operating certificates, regulates
them, and provides financial support to them.25' The FAA han-
dles all other aspects of airman, aircraft, airport, and airline
safety as well as providing air traffic control and navigation ser-
241 Airdisaster.com, Accident Synopsis for Douglas DC-7B, Sunland, CA, http:/
/www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view _details.cgi?date=01311957&reg=N8210H&
airline=Douglas+Corporation (last visited May 11, 2010).
242 Aviation Safety Network, Aircraft Accident Douglas CD-7 N6328C, Arden,
NV, http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19580421-0.
243 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
244 Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
245 49 U.S.C. subtitle I; DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 232, at 21. This section
borrows from Dempsey, supra note 23, at 43-44.
246 The five-year term was added in an FAA Appropriations Bill in 1996 in or-
der to give the agency some stability. Before that, the agency had been headed
by a string of Administrators, and therefore been denied continuity of leadership.
247 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d).
248 Navigation of U.S. airspace by foreign air carriers is governed by 40 U.S.C.
§ 41703.
249 The FAA Administrator is charged with promoting aviation safety, promot-
ing aviation security, ensuring the safe and efficient utilization of the national
airspace, overseeing of the U.S. airport system, and supporting national defense
requirements. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.
250 See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regulation: The Constitutional
Tension Between Police Power, Preemption & Takings, 11 PENN ST. ENVr'L L. REv. 1
(2002) (discussing the tension between local and federal regulation of aviation
and airports).
251 49 U.S.C. § 44706; 14 C.F.R. pts. 71-109.
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vices.25 2 It may require design or maintenance changes from
manufacturers and carriers through the issuance of Airworthi-
ness Directives (AD).25 Under U.S. law, actions of the Secretary
of Transportation and of the FAA Administrator must be consis-
tent with the international obligations imposed by the Chicago
Convention.2 M
The accident investigation and recommendation responsibili-
ties of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, which was created in
1938, were transferred to the FAA initially, and in 1967 they
were re-delegated to the NTSB, made independent in 1974.255
The NTSB thereby was affirmed as "an independent Govern-
ment agency, located within the Department of Transportation,
to promote transportation safety by conducting independent ac-
cident investigations and by formulating safety improvement
recommendations."2 5 6 The Act noted: "Proper conduct of the
responsibilities assigned to this Board requires vigorous investi-
gation of [transportation] accidents . ... No federal agency can
perform such functions unless it is totally separate and indepen-
dent from any other department, bureau, commission or agency
of the United States."25 Accordingly, the NTSB is separate from
all other U.S. governmental institutions.
Since its formal independence in 1974, the NTSB has become
a global leader in performing the mission of accident investiga-
tions. One source noted that the NTSB "enjoys the reputation
of being the most important safety investigative authority in the
world; the caliber of its investigations has become the interna-
tional standard. The NTSB is considered to be the best in the
business and has served as a model for independent investiga-
tive authorities in many countries. "258
252 DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 230, §§ 12.48-12.54.
253 See Lewis Eidson, Investigation and Discovery of Aviation Accidents, Am. Assoc.
of Trial Lawyers Annual Convention Reference Materials, 1 Aviation Law (July
2002). FAA, Airworthiness Directives Process, http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air
cert/continuedoperation/ad/.
254 49 U.S.C. § 40105(b).
255 Independent Safety Board Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, Title III (1974). In
1966, the NTSB was established as an independent agency within the newly-cre-
ated U.S. Department of Transportation. In 1974, the U.S. Congress passed the
Independent Safety Board Act, formalizing the NTSB's independence from the
USDOT. See also Dempsey, supra note 23, at 43 n.213.
256 49 U.S.C. § 1901(1).
257 Id. § 1901(2).
258 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
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The primary mission of the NTSB is to investigate the facts
and circumstances, determine the probable cause of safety inci-
dents and accidents in all modes of transport, 259 and issue rec-
ommendations to transportation agencies such as the FAA so as
to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. 2 6 0 Though the NTSB
has the power to investigate and make recommendations to fed-
eral, state, and local arms of government, it is without regulatory
or enforcement jurisdiction'.2 ' The FAA has the power to pro-
mulgate and enforce regulations and the responsibility to con-
sider and respond to NTSB recommendations. Within ninety
days of the receipt of an NTSB recommendation, the Secretary
of Transportation must indicate whether it intends: "(1) to carry
out procedures to adopt the complete recommendation; (2) to
carry out procedures to adopt a part of the recommendation; or
(3) to refuse to carry out procedures to adopt the recommenda-
tion."26 Annually, the Department of Transportation must re-
port to the Congress what action, if any, it has taken on the
NTSB recommendations, such as the issuance, or amendment,
of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs); in turn, the NTSB is di-
rected to review that report and submit comments to the appro-
priate congressional committees.6 The risk of such a process is
that the NTSB may be perceived as having co-ownership of the
259 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (a).
260 49 U.S.C. § 1131; ILAURENCE GESELL & PAUL DEMPSEY, AvIATION AND THE
LAw 761 (4th ed. 2005).
261 Id. § 1116 directs the NTSB to:
(a) ... report periodically to Congress, departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the United States Government and State and
local governmental authorities concerned with transportation
safety, and other interested persons. The report shall-
(1) advocate meaningful responses to reduce the likelihood of
transportation accidents similar to those investigated by the Board;
and
(2) propose corrective action to make the transportation of indi-
viduals as safe and free from risk of injury as possible, including
action to minimize personal injuries that occur in transportation
accidents.
(b) Studies, Investigations, and Other Reports.-The Board also
shall-
(1) carry out special studies and investigations about transporta-
tion safety, including avoiding personal injury;
(2) examine techniques and methods of accident investigation and
periodically publish recommended procedures for accident
investigations.
262 Id. § 1135(a).
263 Id. § 1135(d).
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result, thereby compromising its objectivity and independence.
It blends the investigation and recommendation roles of the in-
vestigator with the regulatory role of the regulator. It would be
preferable to have these roles kept strictly separate. The NTSB
should not be asked to comment to Congress on the decision of
the FAA either to adopt, reject, or accept with modifications the
recommendations of the NTSB.
NTSB findings have inspired a plethora of FAA safety regula-
tions, airworthiness directives, service bulletins, and enforce-
ment actions. Hence, their respective roles are clearly separate
and defined. Historically, the FAA has responded positively to
90% of the NTSB's urgent recommendations and 80% of all its
recommendations.2 64
Though the NTSB has jurisdiction to investigate safety inci-
dents and accidents in all modes of transport, overwhelmingly
the bulk of its work is aviation related. The NTSB investigates
all public aircraft accidents in the United States and participates
in the investigation of accidents abroad where the United States
is the State of registry, operator, designer, or manufacture.2 11
Thus, as BEA investigates most accidents involving Airbus air-
craft, the NTSB investigates accidents involving Boeing aircraft.
The National Transportation Safety "Board" is comprised of
five individuals appointed by the President and confirmed with
the "advice and consent" of the Senate for terms of five years,
and supported by a staff of several hundred. 2 6 6 At least three of
the members shall be appointed "on the basis of technical quali-
fication, professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge in
accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human factors,
transportation safety, or transportation regulation.""6 Note that
the five-year term of NTSB Board members exceeds the four-
year term of the President, meaning that he may inherit Board
members appointed by his predecessor and that his successor
264 Relationship Between the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Trans-
portation Safety Board: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 103d Cong., 65 1993 (letter from Steve Kaplan and Mortimer
Downey to Sen. Larry Pressler).
265 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [U.S. GAO], GAO-07-118, NA-
TIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD: PROGRESS MADE, YET MANAGEMENT PRAC-
TICES, INVESTIGATION PRIORITIES, AND TRAINING CENTER USE SHOULD BE IMPROVED
33 (Nov. 2006).
266 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b), (c); see also NTSB, What Is the National Transportation
Safety Board?, at 2-3, available at http://www.ntsb.gov/AbtNTSB/What-Is-The-
NTSB.pdf (last visited June 28, 2010).
267 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b).
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may inherit Board members appointed by him. Also, no more
than three of the five members may be members of the same
political party.26 8 Board members may only be removed from
office prior to the expiration of their term for "inefficiency, neg-
lect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 26 9 However, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, the President may designate who
among the Board members shall serve as Chairman and Vice
Chairman, each for a two-year term.2 70
The NTSB's investigations consist of four phases: (1) launch;
(2) fact finding; (3) analysis; and (4) report production.2 7 1
When a "major accident" occurs, a fact-finding team normally is
dispatched to the scene within hours of notification.2 7 2 The
team leader is a senior investigator termed the investigator-in-
charge (IIC). *273
Under the direction of the IIC, a NTSB investigator heads a
working group (Accident Investigation Committee) in each area
of expertise, which in aviation can usually involve the specialized
areas of operations, structures, power plants, systems, air naviga-
tion services, weather, human performance, and survival.2 74
Working groups are staffed by "parties" to the investigation that
have technical expertise in the area.275 According to NTSB reg-
ulations, parties are "limited to those persons, government agen-
cies, companies, and associations whose employees, functions,
activities, or products were involved in the accident or incident,
and who can provide suitable qualified technical personnel ac-
tively to assist in the investigation."2 7 6 These may include, for
example, aircraft operators and manufacturers of aircraft, en-
gines, and component parts. It always includes FAA representa-
tives, but it never includes persons in legal or litigation
positions.
268 Id.
269 Id. § 1111(c).
270 Id. § 1111(d).
271 U.S. GAO, supra note 265, at 12.
272 Id. at 13. The NTSB considers an event to constitute a "major accident" if it
either involves an issue related to a current safety study or investigation, impacts
public confidence or transportation safety in a significant way, or is catastrophic.
Id.
273 NTSB, About the NTSB: The Investigative Process, http://www.ntsb.gov/abt
ntsb/invest.htm (last visited June 26, 2010).
274 U.S. GAO, supra note 265, at 14; NTSB, supra note 273.
275 NTSB, supra note 273.
276 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (2005).
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The NTSB's party system creates a potential conflict of inter-
est or a perception of a conflict of interest.277 Air operators and
manufacturers have valuable expertise that can be useful in the
determination of the cause of an accident-they can provide es-
sential information that cannot be gleaned from other sources
concerning such vital issues as aircraft design and assembly, air-
line operations, and flight systems.2 78 One source notes that,
"[w]ithout the input and expertise of the parties it is unlikely
that the NTSB would have the technical capability to determine
the cause of complex aviation accidents."2 7 9 Yet, operators and
manufacturers also can be named as defendants and found lia-
ble for damages in tort litigation filed by survivors and the es-
tates of those killed or injured in the accident. Civil liability in
mass disaster litigation can be tremendously expensive, while
the prospect of criminal liability can be terrifying. Though their
lawyers are banned from participating in the investigation, they
likely are not far from it, as the liability consequences of the
accident investigation findings on causation can greatly influ-
ence the outcome of litigation.
Though the air operators and manufacturers may participate
in the accident investigation, potential plaintiffs such as family
representatives, claimants, and their representatives, may not.28s
The plaintiffs tend to view this as unfair, as it gives potential
defendants not only advanced access to the evidence, but also
the potential ability to influence the outcome of the investiga-
tion. One source observes, "This inherent conflict of interest
may jeopardize, or be perceived to jeopardize, the integrity of
the NTSB investigation. "281
After the 1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800 over Long Island,
New York, killing 230 passengers and crew, President Bill Clin-
ton established a White House Commission on Aviation Safety
277 See London, supra note 4, at 39-42. "[T]he NTSB's heavy dependence on
party participants to provide technical assistance often results in NTSB reports,
observations, and data which make NTSB evidence fall outside rather than inside
the tests for trustworthiness and reliability which the federal and most state rules
of evidence impose as conditions of admissibility." Id. at 40.
278 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at 34.
279 Id. at 99.
280 See Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the exclusion of a representative of the pilot's estate to participate in
or observe testing and disassembly of the engines involved in a general aviation
crash).
281 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at xiv.
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and Security chaired by Vice President Al Gore." Among the
salient recommendations was that the NTSB "formally review"
the party system.2 8 8
The theoretical and practical realities are quite different. The
NTSB's statute and regulations attempt to separate the investiga-
tive process from the litigation process and explicitly provide
they are not conducted for the purpose of determining rights or
liabilities of any party.284 But this theoretical isolation is difficult
to achieve in a practical environment in which the investigation
relies on the party process to assist it in determining causation,
and in which the litigation process relies so heavily on the
NTSB's findings on causation.
Although U.S. law provides that NTSB reports "relating to any
accident or the investigation thereof' may not be introduced as
evidence in "any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report, "285 and further precludes
NTSB investigators from testifying in court,28 6 the reality is that
such reports are viewed as "roadmaps to liability," and often trial
is postponed until the Final Report is prepared.2 8 ' For its part,
282 Id. at 3.
288 Id. at 4.
284 49 C.F.R. § 831.5 (2005).
285 49 U.S.C. §§ 1441(e), 1903(c). 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) provides: "No part of
any report or reports of the Board relating to any accident or the investigation
thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports." Courts have
held that this prohibition renders only the NTSB's formal reports inadmissible,
and does not require exclusion of the testimony of those having firsthand factual
knowledge of the causes of an accident. GESELL & DEMPSEY, supTa note 260, at
762-63. Further, though those portions of the findings of probable cause of an
NTSB report may be excluded, some courts have allowed admission of the factual
portions of the report. Id. Cockpit voice recorder transcripts prepared by the
NTSB are also inadmissible unless the court decides a transcript is required for a
fair trial. PAUL LARSEN, JOSEPH SWEENEY & JOHN GILLICK, AVIATION LAw: CASES,
LAWS AND RELATED SOURCES 704 (2006). But see, Rachel Clingman, Admissibility
and Use of NTSB and FAA Reports in Civil Litigation, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION
CASE 383, 406 (A. Harakas ed., 3rd ed. 2008) ("The circumstances surrounding a
particular incident, the amount of publicity it receives, and the decisions made by
the NTSB and FAA during and following their investigations all impact the final
determination a court may make regarding admissibility in a subsequent civil
case.").
286 Wendell Smith, The General Aviation Case, 12 UTAH B.J. 17, 18 (Feb. 1999)
("The NTSB permits the deposition to be taken of their investigators. However,
the testimony of these investigators is limited strictly to the facts."); see also ROB-
ERT JARVIS, JAMES CROUSE, JAMES Fox & GREGORY WALDEN, AVIATION LAw: CASES
AND MATERIALS 72-105 (2006).
287 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at 81-82.
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the NTSB has promulgated regulations attempting to differenti-
ate between (admissible) factual accident reports, and (inadmis-
sible) Board accident reports (which include the probable cause
finding).288 Several U.S. federal appellate courts have con-
cluded that NTSB reports are inadmissible in litigation."8
Upon gathering information and analyzing it, the NTSB will
issue an accident investigation report (the Final Accident Re-
port, or "Blue Book"), usually between twelve and eighteen
288 49 C.F.R. pt. 835 (2005). 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 provides that "no part of a
Board accident report may be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action
for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report." Id. § 835.2
Although NTSB accident reports may not be admitted into evidence in a judicial
proceeding, certain factual information derived during the investigation of an
accident in preparation for an accident report may be admissible. Section 835.2
distinguishes between the NTSB accident reports and factual accident reports.
Id. A "factual accident report" is the result of the NTSB investigation. Id. Sec-
tion 835.2 also provides that the NTSB "does not object to, and there is no statu-
tory bar to, admission in litigation of factual accident reports." Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court also attempted to clarify the distinction between "factual find-
ings" and inadmissible "conclusions" in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153
(1988). See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 780 F. Supp. 1207
(N.D. Ill. 1991); London, supra note 4, at 73 ("Because of the statutory inadmissi-
bility of NTSB probable cause final reports, parties do not have the use of public,
professional, and unprivileged evidence, theoretically because it would improp-
erly sway the jury and because it would impair the neutrality and independence
of the NTSB."); Roy Tess Atwood, Comment, Admissibility of National Transporta-
tion Safety Board Investigations in Civil Air Crash Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 469
(1987).
289 See, e.g., Chiron Corp. & Perspective Biosystems v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, 138 F.3d 996, 1001 (5th
Cir. 1998). Some courts have held that the statute acts as a complete bar to the
admission of any portion of the NTSB final report or sub-reports. Protectus Al-
pha Navigation v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, 767 F.2d 1379, 1384-385 (9th Cir.
1985); Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Curry v.
Chevron, 779 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985); Berguido v. E. Air Lines, 317 F.2d 628
(3d. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 895; Lobel v. Am. Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 945; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, Denver, Colorado, on November 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1493, 1495-96
(D. Colo. 1989). A number of law review articles have addressed the issue of
admissibility of NTSB reports and findings as evidence in civil litigation. See, e.g.,
Leane Medford & Steven Sanfelippo, Admissible or Inadmissible? Getting In-Or
Keeping Out-Government Documents in Aviation Cases, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 449
(2006); Christopher Christensen, Changing Tides in The Law Regarding Admissibility
of NTSB Final Accident Reports, AIR & SPACE LAw. (Spring, 2005); London, supra
note 4; Roy Tess Atwood, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety Board Reports
in Civil Air Crash Litigation, 53 J. AIR L & COM. 469 (1987); Aaron Podhurst, The
Use of NTSB and FAA Reports and Other Documents Under the New Federal Rules of
Evidence, 12 FORuM 180 (1976); Note, Evidence-Expert Witnesses-49 C.F.R. § 835,
51 J. AIR L. & COM. 243 (1985).
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months after the accident. 29 0 The report includes a list of fac-
tual findings relevant to the accident, a finding of probable
cause, and often includes recommendations, including propos-
als for new or amended procedures or regulations."9
The Rand Institute for Civil Justice performed a comprehen-
sive assessment of the NTSB, concluding:
Although it is not a regulatory agency and does not command
significant enforcement powers, the NTSB exerts enormous in-
fluence based on the independence and accuracy of its accident
investigations and the authority of its recommendations. The
NTSB is charged with the responsibility for investigating and es-
tablishing the facts, circumstances, and probable cause of trans-
portation accidents and making safety recommendations to
governmental agencies to prevent similar accidents from hap-
pening in the future. Fundamentally, the Safety Board provides
a quality assurance function vital to the ongoing safety of all
modes of transportation. The NTSB's unique role in transporta-
tion safety is contingent on the ability of the board members and
the professional staff to conduct independent investigations of
accidents and major incidents and, in so doing, to assure public
confidence in the safety of our national transportation
systems."
V. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS.
This section evaluates the relationship between European
Regulations2 9 3 and Directives2 9 4 ViS-A-vis Annex 13 of the Chi-
cago Convention.
A. CIVIL AVIATION ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
Within the E.C./E.U., the procedures and mechanisms for in-
vestigating civil aviation accidents have long been governed' by
the Chicago Convention, which gave exclusive control of the
290 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at 14.
291 Id.
2 Id. at 14.
293 See E.U. Regulations No. 1592/2002 and No. 216/2008, available at http://
www.easa.eu.int/doc/regulation/BR1592-2002.pdf (last visited May 15, 2010);
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=J:L:2008:079:0001:
0049:EN:PDF.
-4 Council Directive 1994/56, 1994 O.J. (L319/14) (EC) (establishing the
fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and
incidents). Directive 2003/42, 2003 O.J. (L167/24) (EC) (requiring mandatory
incident registration in aviation). See also DEMPSEY, supra note 43, at 144-45.
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process to the Member State where such an accident occurred
and, where different, the home State of the carrier that suffered
the accident.295 But with the passage of the Third Package of air
transport liberalization," 6 it became more difficult to neatly
identify which Member States had an interest in such an investi-
gation. Therefore, the Council determined that it was necessary
to provide guidance to harmonize the investigation processes in
the Member States.
To this end, in 1994 the Council issued Directive 94/56 with
the goal of "facilitating the expeditious holding of investigations
. . . ."29' The terms of the directive apply to all investigations of
accidents or incidents within the territory of the E.U., along with
accidents or "serious incidents" outside of the territory of the
E.U. if the aircraft concerned are registered in a Member State
or owned by an undertaking established in a Member State, and
the State where the event took place does not conduct such an
investigation. 29 8 For the purpose of the directive, an "accident"
is defined as an event that occurs while passengers are onboard
the aircraft and where the event results in the death of, or seri-
ous injury to, a person, where the aircraft is seriously damaged,
or where the aircraft "is missing or is completely inaccessible."2 9 9
An "incident" is an event, other than an accident, which affects
or would affect the safety of the aircraft, while a "serious inci-
dent" is an event that involves circumstances suggesting an acci-
dent nearly occurred. 0o
Every accident and serious incident must be subjected to a
mandatory investigation, while lesser incidents may be investi-
gated at the discretion of concerned Member States.o' A Mem-
ber State may delegate its investigatory duties to another
Member State.3 0 2 The scope and nature of the investigation is
determined by the appropriate investigating bodies, but, consis-
tent with Annex 13,303 the sole objective of the investigation is to
prevent its recurrence, and not to assign "blame or liability" for
- Council Directive 94/56, Preamble, 1994 O.J. (L319) (EC).
-6 DEMPSEY, supra note 43.
27 Council Directive 94/56, art. 1.
298 Id. art. 2(1)-(2) (i)-(ii).
29 Id. art. 3(a) (1)-(3).
3e Id. art. 3(j)-(k); see the Annex to the Directive for a list of possible events
which would constitute a "serious incident."
-1 Council Directive 94/56, art. 4(1).
-2 Id. art. 6(5).
30 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 3.1.
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the event.30 4 A Member State may use whatever procedures are
appropriate within its legislative system for establishing or defin-
ing an investigating body. 0 5 However, the investigating body
must have free access to all relevant materials and evidence re-
lated to the event, such as manufacturers' design information
and the site of the incident.30 6 The investigating body must also
be "functionally independent" from other national aviation au-
thorities.30o Specifically, the accident/incident investigation
agency must "be functionally independent . .. of the national
aviation authorities responsible for airworthiness, certification,
flight operation, maintenance, licensing, air traffic control or
airport operation and . . . of any other party whose interests
could conflict with the task entrusted to the investigating body
or entity.""3 0  The investigating body must be a permanent and
independent body with sufficient resources to be able to per-
form its duties properly.30 ' However, it may request assistance
from other national agencies for the supply of installations and
equipment for certain aspects of the investigation process. 10
This would include everything from hangars to store crash deb-
ris to specialized lab facilities for examination of flight data re-
corders.s1 ' Wherever possible, this assistance should be
supplied at no cost.3 12 These requirements facilitate the obliga-
tion set forth in Annex 13 requiring the accident investigatory
authority be independent in the conduct of the investigation
and have unrestricted authority over it.3 13
Any investigation into an accident must be the subject of a
mandatory accident report summarizing the investigating body's
findings and its safety recommendations, if any. 1 ' The report
must be made public, preferably within twelve months of the
accident.3 1 I The conditions attached to an incident report are
significantly more stringent, presumably because the less severe
nature of the event militates against the release of superfluous
304 Council Directive 94/56, art. 4(2)-(3).
305 Id. art. 5(1).
30 Id. art. 5(2)(a)-(g).
so7 Id. art. 6(1).
308 Id. art. 6(1).
3o9 Id. art. 6(1), (3)
310 Id. art. 6(3)-(4)(a).
3" See id. art. 6(4)(a).
312 Id. art. 6(4) (b).
313 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.4.
314 Council Directive 94/56, art. 7(1).
31 Id. art. 7(2).
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information. While an incident report must be generated, in-
cluding safety recommendations where appropriate, it should
guard the anonymity of any persons involved in the incident.3 16
Furthermore, unlike the accident report, which is to be publicly
distributed, an incident report need only be provided to "the
parties likely to benefit" from its determinations.1 Any safety
recommendations included in either type of report must be pro-
vided to all of the concerned parties and to the Commission. 1 8
Such recommendations shall not give rise to "a presumption of
blame or liability for" the event being investigated.1
Although Directive 94/56 establishes minimum standards for
E.U. Member States, it is silent as to several issues addressed in
Annex 13 including, according to European air lawyer Nikolai
Ehlers, "disclosure of records, participation of accredited repre-
sentatives, [and] access to information . . . ."320 Ehlers points
out that though the "directive is not intended to be a detailed
set of rules for accident investigations . .. [it] seems to be some-
what out of balance because of the total lack of provisions deal-
ing with the rights of those directly or indirectly affected by the
accident .... "
Directive 2003/42 addresses "occurrence" reporting. An "oc-
currence" is "an operational interruption, defect, fault or other
irregular circumstance that has or may have influenced flight
safety and has not resulted in an accident or serious incident
. "322 Here again, "the sole objective of occurrence report-
ing" is prevention and not the attribution of fault or blame.
The Directive seeks to improve air safety "by ensuring that rele-
vant information on safety is reported, collected, stored, pro-
tected, and disseminated."3 2 4  Among the governmental
institutions that may be designated to collect and store the infor-
mation in an accessible database are the accident investigation
bodies of the E.U. Member States. 2
316 Id. art. 8(1).
317 Id. art. 8(2).
318 Id. art. 9.
319 Id. art. 10.
320 P. Nikolai Ehlers, Why European Law Is Good for American Charter Carriers, 10
AIR & SPACE LAw. 1 (1996).
321 Id.
322 Council Directive 2003/42, art. 2(1), 2003 O.J. (L167) 3 (EC).
323 Id. art. 1.
324 Id.
5 Id. art. 5(1) (b).
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To further the purposes of Directive 2003/42, in 2007, the
E.U. established a central repository (compatible with the EC-
CAIRS system) to store, process and exchange safety informa-
tion at the E.U. level.3 26 The Commission also issued
regulations governing the dissemination of information so
collected. 2
In recent years, two important European safety organizations
have been created-the European Air Safety Agency (EASA), in
2002,2 and the Council of European Aviation Safety Investiga-
tion Authorities (CEASIA), in 2006.32' EASA's principal pur-
pose is to establish uniformity on the issue of aviation safety
within Europe.33 0 EASA enjoys comprehensive authority to ex-
ercise E.U. Member States' aircraft certification functions under
the Chicago Convention's Annex 8-Airworthiness of Air-
craft.33 1 EASA handed out its first aircraft type certification in
2003, and established its headquarters in K61n the following
year. Thus far, as the E.U. regulator of civil aviation, EASA has
remained free of the accident investigatory function. This sepa-
ration of regulatory and investigatory functions is contemplated
by Directive 94/56, though EASA's jurisdiction may be ex-
panded to address other aviation functions.3
The Council of European ASIAs was established by the investi-
gation authorities of the twenty-seven E.U. Member States in
2006 to coordinate activities, share resources and expertise, and
exchange information.3  It is represented by the "[h]eads of
the aviation safety investigation authorities of the E.U. Member
States.33 4 Observers include the European Commission and
other ECAC Member States."3 3 5 The Council performs an im-
326 Commission Regulation 1321/2007, 2007 J.0. (L294) 3 (EC); European
Commission, Revision of the E. U. Regulatory Framework for Civil Aviation Accident In-
vestigation and Occurrence Reporting, Council of EASA meeting (powerpoint presen-
tation Riga, May 21, 2009) (on file with author).
327 Commission Regulation 1330/2007, 2007 J.0. (L295) 7 (EC).
328 Commission Regulation 1592/2002, 2002 J.0. (L240) 1 (EC).
3 ICAO, Regional Cooperation (The European Example), at 4 (ICAO, Working Pa-
per AIG/08-WP/36) [hereinafter ICAO Working Paper], available at http://www.
icao.int/AIGdivO8/docs/AIGdivO8_WP36_en.pdf (last visited May 12, 2010).
3o Commission Regulation 1592/2002.
33 Commission Regulation 216/2008, 2008 J.0. (L79) 1 (EC).
332 See Council Directive 94/56, 1994 0.J. (L319) (EC).
3 The Council was established in 2006 after the proposal of the Aviation
Working Group of the E.U. Group of Experts on Transport Accident Investiga-
tion. ICAO Working Paper, supra note 329, at 4.
334 Id.
335 See id.
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portant function as a body for coordination of accident investi-
gation among Member States and as a liaison with the
institutions of the European Union." 6 The Council is a deci-
sion-making body with an "Executive" Bureau to act on its be-
half.3 3 7 A dialogue has been established between the Council,
the European Commission, and EASA."3
In 2003, the European Commission established a "Group of
Experts" to advise it on a strategy to address accidents in the
transport sector. 33  In 2006, the group issued its report, includ-
ing several recommendations of relevance to the issue of inde-
pendence of accident investigation bodies:
* A Safety Investigation Authority shall have unrestricted au-
thority over its conduct and shall be granted the power and
the resources to fulfill its tasks independently, effectively and
in a competent manner.
* The Safety Investigation Authority shall be set up perma-
nently and shall carry out its tasks impartially. Its functional,
financial and legal independence from any other public bod-
ies or third parties shall be guaranteed. The Safety Investiga-
tion Authority shall especially be independent from those
authorities responsible for the establishment or enforcement
of safety requirements that are imposed on the transport
sector.340
In 2007, the European Commission issued an "information
document" addressing the role of the Community in accident
investigations.3 4 1 In it, the Commission addressed two
questions:
1. Whether the competence to designate and exercise the func-
tions of the "accredited representative" under Annex 13 to
the Chicago Convention resided in the Community or with
Member States; and
2. If competence resides in the Community, whether EASA




33 Commission Decision 2003/425, 2003 O.J. (L144) 10 (EC).
340 European Methodology for Safety Investigation of Accidents and Incidents in the
Transport Sector (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/safetyinvesti
gation/doc/2006_accidentinvestigation-methodology-guidelines en.pdf (last
visited May 12, 2010).
341 European Commission, Agenda Item 14: Accident Investigations, EASA MB 03/
2007, WP 14 Accident Investigations (June 13, 2007) (on file with author).
342 Id. at 2-3.
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As to the first question, the Commission observed that the def-
initions of the "State of Registry," the "State of Design," and the
"State of Manufacture" are the same in both Annex 13 and An-
nex 8, which addresses airworthiness of aircraft."' The Com-
mission "assumed" that the reason why Annex 13 designates
these States as competent to appoint an accredited representa-
tive is that these functions have been attributed to these States
with respect to the certification of aircraft as airworthy under
Annex 8. Because airworthiness within the E.U. had been
comprehensively addressed in Regulation 1592/2002, the Com-
mission concluded that "the Community, and not member
States, is now competent to designate the 'accredited represen-
tative' of the State of Design, the State of Manufacture and the
State of Registry, where the aircraft concerned has been de-
signed, manufactured or registered within the Community,
respectively."3 4 1
As to the second question, the Commission observed that Arti-
cle 15(1) of Regulation 1592/2002 had delegated to EASAjuris-
diction "as specified in the Chicago Convention or its Annexes,
[to] carry out on behalf of member States the functions and
tasks of the State of design, manufacture or registry when re-
lated to design approval."" The Commission therefore con-
cluded that it would not be justified to designate EASA as the
sole "accredited representative" of the Community under Annex
13.34 Instead, the Community's "accredited representative"
should be the Commission, which could be assisted by "advisers"
of EASA and the accident investigation authorities of the Mem-
ber States. 4 Alternatively, the Commission could appoint a
person proposed by EASA as the "accredited representative" for
all matters related to design approval, and the person(s) pro-
posed by Member States where the aircraft has been assembled
or registered for questions relating to those issues.3 4 9 Though it
thought the ideal solution would be to establish an independent
E.U. accident investigation body, the Commission favored the
second alternative as a "pragmatic solution."3 5 0
344 Id.
34 Id. at 3-4.




350 Id. at 5.
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Involving EASA in the investigation process-and in the criti-
cal task of designating the IIC-poses a troubling challenge to
the independence and autonomy of the accident investigation
process, for EASA is the aviation safety regulator for the E.U.
Moreover, it appears the Commission is confused about the re-
spective roles Annexes 8 and 13 play-the former addressing
certification of aircraft as airworthy, and the latter addressing
the quite different issue of investigation of safety failures. An-
nex 13 explicitly provides that the investigative authority must
have independence in, and unrestricted authority over, the con-
duct of the investigation.5 Moreover, in promulgating E.U. Di-
rective 94/56, the Council explicitly mandated that the
investigatory body "be functionally independent of the aviation
authorities responsible for airworthiness." 5 2 For example, if
EASA participates in the selection of the IIC, how can the inves-
tigator be expected to objectively assess whether, in a particular
case, EASA deficiently certified an aircraft as airworthy?
Though Brussels appears tenaciously dedicated to stripping
power from Member States and vesting it in E.U. institutions,
allowing EASA to participate in the investigatory process in any
way is fraught with peril, for it would undermine the integrity
and credibility of the investigation, as many States have learned
through hard experience. As George Santayana observed,
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to re-
peat it."3 53
In 2009, the European Commission identified the following
concerns with the status quo:
* Unclear relationship between Community and Member States
in accident investigation;
* Lack of uniform quality standards;
* Serious weaknesses in the implementation of safety
recommendations;
* Under-optimal use of resources;
* Tensions between safety and judicial procedures; and
* Insufficient protection of the interests of air crash victims and
their families.354
s5 Annex 13, supra note 3, 1 5.4 ("[T] he accident investigation authority shall
have independence in the conduct of the investigation and have unrestricted
authority over its conduct . . . .").
352 Council Directive 94/56, art. 6(1).
353Wikiquote, George Santayana, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/George_Santa
yana (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
3 European Commission, supra note 326.
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Among the alternatives under consideration are: (1) do noth-
ing; (2) promote voluntary cooperation; (3) modify Directives
94/54 and 2003/42 and introduce a number of central func-
tions; or (4) establish a centralized European Civil Aviation Acci-
dent Investigation Body (such as an E.U. "NTSB").66 In
October 2009, the E.U. Commission issued a proposed regula-
tion addressing the role of the accident investigator. 5' Among
its principles is that: "The safety investigation authority shall be
functionally independent in particular of aviation authorities re-
sponsible for airworthiness, certification, flight operation, main-
tenance, licensing, air traffic control or airport operation and,
in general, of any other party whose interests could conflict with
the task entrusted to the safety investigation authority or influ-
ence its objectivity."3 5 ' Further, the draft regulation provides,
"The safety investigation authority shall be given the means re-
quired to carry out its responsibilities independently and shall
be able to obtain sufficient resources to do so."13 5  However the
final rule is written, the European Union would be well advised
to keep the regulatory and investigatory functions and institu-
tions separate, independent, and autonomous.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of an accident investigation can be politically and
economically devastating. If, for example, domestic transport
regulatory institutions or governmental service providers are
found to have been lax in enforcement, oversight, or service
provision, the political fallout can be serious. If foreign govern-
mental institutions are found to have been deficient, the foreign
policy ramifications also can be unpleasant. If air carriers or
manufacturers are found to have been less than diligent, the ec-
onomic impact in terms of mandated repairs and modifications,
design changes, and operating procedures can be tremendously
expensive, as can the potential liability and criminal exposure in
litigation, and the loss of market share because of a decline in
consumer confidence. 3 5 9
355 Id.
356 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Investigation and Prevention of Accidents and Incidents in Civil Aviation,
EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 611) 7 (2009).
57 Id. art. 5.2.
358 Id. art. 5.5.
35 SARSFIELD ET AL., supra note 11, at 30.
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Strong political and economic forces can be mobilized to try
to influence the investigation and bias the outcome or the deter-
mined cause(s) of an aviation accident. These challenges re-
quire an investigation that is performed by an investigatory body
that is independent, unbiased, honest, free of political or indus-
try influence, has unhampered access to the evidence, has ade-
quate financial, human and operational resources, and
possesses a high degree of professional competence, integrity,
and expertise. Many States have learned this the hard way-by
facing public skepticism when the investigator lacks impartiality
or independence, or when the investigatory process has been
tainted by politics.
One source notes that the credibility of an accident investiga-
tion agency depends on "the independence, timeliness, and ac-
curacy of its factual findings and analytical conclusions."so0
Independence and competence are essential for credibility.
Credibility is essential for the implementation of measures es-
sential for the improvement of the safety of air transport.
Change, though sometimes necessary, can be socially and eco-
nomically difficult. These difficulties can be more easily over-
come if the institution advocating change is perceived as
competent, objective, and credible.
As we have seen, many States have made investigation institu-
tions organizationally, operationally, and functionally indepen-
dent and autonomous from other governmental institutions,
and in particular the transport regulator and the judiciary.
Functionally, the safety investigator often is separated from the
safety regulator-the investigator investigates the causes of
safety accidents and incidents and makes recommendations to
the regulator for corrective action, while the regulator promul-
gates and enforces regulations on manufacturers and carriers,
principally, but also airports, air navigation providers, and main-
tenance operators. Both investigators and regulators have safety
as their ultimate goal, but their organizational and functional
lines are kept firm so as to enhance the objectivity of the investi-
gating agency, and therefore the credibility of its findings.
Often these organizational and functional lines have been
drawn after a tainted accident investigation has caused an ero-
sion in public confidence in the investigator's objectivity.
Among the institutions that sometimes warrant investigation is
the regulator itself; hence, allowing the regulator to influence
3o Id. at xiii.
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the investigation creates a manifest conflict of interest. The fox
should never be allowed to guard the hen house."'
So too, the functional and operational lines of the regulator
are kept separate in many States from the judiciary and its civil
and criminal litigation and its world of litigators, prosecutors,
sheriffs, and jails. The investigating body focuses on causes of
accidents as a catalyst for corrective and preventive action, and
not on blame or the imposition of sanctions. In contrast, civil or
criminal litigation focuses on causation as a catalyst for blame
(fault), liability, compensation, and sometimes crime and pun-
ishment. Keeping these functions separate helps ensure that
the investigatory body is free from conflicts of interest which
may jeopardize its objectivity as a safety watchdog, and thereby
corrode its credibility. 36 2 According to aviation expert Francis
Shubert, although coordination between these investigatory
bodies "is desirable and necessary, the effectiveness of the safety
investigation requires full independence of the investigation
board."3 6 3
One must add that the growing trend toward criminalization
of aviation accidents-driven by families, the press, and polit-
ics-may impede the ability of the investigator to acquire evi-
dence from parties that may themselves be subject to
prosecution, and may chill voluntary incident reporting. Unless
there is evidence of an intentional wrong, there can be little jus-
tification for criminal prosecution.3 64 Often, an accident has
been caused by simple, ordinary negligence. Criminalization of
aviation accidents may actually be detrimental to safety.365 Ab-
361 Kenneth Elsea, Independence: The (Often) Missing Ingredient in Root Causes and
Corrective Actions 1 (Paper presented to the Sixth Annual Human Performance,
Route Cause & Trending Workshop, Phila., Pa., June 12-15, 2000).
362 Shubert, supra note 3, at 33-34. Shubert notes that, beyond formal auton-
omy, "Independence is also guaranteed by making sure that parties that may have
a particular interest of their own, different from the promotion of aviation safety,
are not allowed to take part in the investigation." Id.
363 Id. at 32-33.
36 NTSB Bar Association, supra note 183, at 923. ("The damage done to avia-
tion safety by prosecutions undertaken where there is no clear intent to commit a
crime does not justify the marginal benefit that might result from such prosecu-
tions .... The application of criminal laws should be reserved only in cases where
there is independent evidence of intentional criminal activity.").
365 See id. at 877-78. ("[T]he increased involvement of criminal investigators
actually may be detrimental to aviation safety, since aviation professionals fear
that routine business decisions could now become the basis for criminal prosecu-
tions. As a result of the increased involvement of criminal investigators, these
witnesses could become more guarded when dealing with accident and safety
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sent intentional harm, we must retreat from the notion that ven-
geance must be exacted whenever human lives are lost.
Internally too, the investigatory body must remain indepen-
dent of those who have an interest in a preferred outcome and
who may seek to bias the result in a direction other than that
which the truth would lead. Families, friends, neighbors of vic-
tims, unions representing flight personnel, airlines and manu-
facturers, and even foreign governments all may have an interest
in skewing the outcome in their direction. Most can be held at
arm's length and excluded from any formal role in the investiga-
tion. But herein lies a significant "catch-22." The manufactur-
ers and the airlines have technical expertise that may be critical
to the investigation. Hence, despite their potential bias, their
essential expertise sometimes requires an invitation to partici-
pate in the investigation. However, they must not be allowed to
interfere with the objectivity of the investigation and must act
properly within the direct control of the IIC as to evidence gath-
ering and evaluation and dissemination of results, be confined
to the performance of specific tasks, and be subject to dismissal
should they stray from the rules established by the IIC.
The families and other interested parties, including lawyers,
though not allowed to participate in the investigation, deserve
transparency during the investigatory process as transparency
enhances credibility of the investigation. Transparency, of
course, must be tempered by the need to refrain from releasing
information prematurely (which might lead to erroneous con-
clusions as to causation), the need to protect the confidentiality
of certain information, and the privacy of those who submit it.
In the final analysis, irrespective of the legislative, organiza-
tional, and procedural mechanisms for achieving autonomy and
independence from political, industry, and other governmental
institutions, the public must have confidence in the integrity
and technical competence of the investigation. The investiga-
tors must show that they have objectively reviewed all the rele-
vant facts, including systemic causes, which often will require
examining airlines, manufacturers, maintenance providers, air
investigators. This, in turn, could lead to less-informed investigators, at the ex-
pense of aviation safety."); id. at 904 ("The reticence of witnesses to disclose infor-
mation may result in error reporting by those individuals who provide testimony
and may ultimately impede an investigation. Approximately seventy-five per cent
of aircraft accidents in the United States involve some form of human error.
Thus, the potential for losing the cooperation of individuals who feel they may
face criminal accusations is very real.").
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navigation service providers, the regulatory framework, and
sometimes too, the governmental institutions responsible for
regulation and policy. 66 The search for the truth must not be
deterred because the truth is unpleasant.
An accident investigation body is like a medical doctor at-
tempting to diagnose the cause of an illness. Sometimes the
doctor must prescribe a remedy that is expensive, inconvenient,
and painful. Only if the doctor is perceived to be both compe-
tent and objective will the patient undergo an unpleasant and
expensive, yet necessary, cure.
366 Smart, supra note 92, at 113.
